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ARE THE SIMILARITIES BETWEEN
A WOMAN'S RIGHT TO CHOOSE
AN ABORTION AND THE ALLEGED
RIGHT TO ASSISTED SUICIDE
REALLY COMPELLING?t
Marc Spindelman*
In this Article, Marc Spindelman examines the relationship between
abortion and assisted suicide. He begins his discussion with the con-
stitutional framework within which courts should consider the
assertion that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
protects an individual's decision to commit assisted suicide. The
Author then considers and, based on relevant Supreme Court doctrine,
rejects the conception of personal autonomy that undergirds the
claimed constitutional right to assisted suicide. Finally, the Author
points out some legal and cultural distinctions between abortion and
assisted suicide, arguing that these distinctions offer courts good
reasons for holding that the Fourteenth Amendment's promise of
liberty does not include the liberty to commit assisted suicide. In
addition, the Author makes a few observations about recent assisted-
suicide cases decided by the Ninth and Second Circuits.
In examining whether a liberty interest exists in deter-
mining the time and manner of one's death, we begin
with the compelling similarities between right-to-die
cases and the abortion cases.
-Compassion in Dying v. Washington,
79 F.3d 790, 800 (9th Cir. 1996).
The recent spate of court challenges to state laws
prohibiting assisted suicide' has drawn renewed attention to
t © 1996 Marc Spindelman, all rights reserved.
* B.A. 1990, Johns Hopkins University; J.D. 1995, University of Michigan
Law School. Friends far too numerous to mention deserve rounds of thanks for
various forms of assistance in the preparation of this work. My professors at the
University of Michigan Law School, as well, have their due for their patience and
encouragement during the course of this project.
1. See, e.g., Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D.
Wash. 1994), rev'd, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding that the U.S. Constitution
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the ongoing debate over the "right to die."2 Not surprisingly,
terms derived from the discourse over other social policy
questions have infused the debate over the right to die.3 For
example, drawing on the language used in the abortion
grants no right to commit assisted suicide), affd, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996) (en
banc), reh'g denied, 85 F.3d 1440 (9th Cir. 1996); Quill v. Koppell, 870 F. Supp. 78
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (same), rev'd sub nom. Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996);
State v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714 (Mich. 1994) (same), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
1795 (1995). See also Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1429 (D. Or. 1995) (challenging
the Oregon referendum permitting physician-assisted suicide on the grounds that it
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Donaldson v.
Van de Kamp, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 59 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (finding no constitutional
right to assisted suicide). Currently, two cases involving a constitutional right to
physician-assisted suicide are pending. See Kevorkian v. Arnett, No. CV 94-6089
(C.D. Cal. filed April 26, 1995); McIver v. Krischer, No. CL 96-1504 (Fla. Cir. Ct.
filed Feb. 16, 1996).
2. The debate over the right to die has generated a considerable degree of
lexical confusion. Those who support a right to die have declared invalid the words
traditionally used to describe the act of ending one's life. For example, they have
contended that when a terminally ill individual ends her life, she does not commit
"suicide." See Robert A. Sedler, The Constitution and Hastening Inevitable Death, 23
HASTINGS CENTER REP., Sept.-Oct. 1993, at 20, 22 [hereinafter Sedler, Hastening
Inevitable Death]. See also Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 824 ("[Wle are doubtful
that deaths resulting from terminally ill patients taking medication prescribed by
their doctors should be classified as 'suicide.' "); Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d at 728
(stating that the choice to discontinue life-sustaining treatment is "not, in effect,
committing suicide," whereas an affirmative act to hasten death is suicide). Propo-
nents of the right to die have created a new vocabulary to describe individuals and
practices involved in the ending of life. Jack Kevorkian and others, for example, call
those doctors who help their patients to end their lives "obitiatrists," and call the
medical practice of physicians helping their patients to end life the practice of
'medicide." JACK KEVORKIAN, PRESCRIPTION: MEDICIDE 202-03 (1991).
3. Professor Yale Kamisar has identified four different meanings encompassed
by the phrase "right to die." Yale Kamisar, Physician-Assisted Suicide: The Last
Bridge to Active Voluntary Euthanasia, in EUTHANASIA EXAMINED: ETHICAL, CLINICAL
AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 225,225 (John Keown ed. 1995). They include: (1) The right
to passive or negative euthanasia. This right was ostensibly at issue in the
Supreme Court's only decision yet to address the right to die, Cruzan v. Director,
Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). Passive euthanasia involves an
individual's decision to refuse or to terminate unwanted medical treatment without
which the individual would not continue to live; (2) The right to suicide. Suicide
involves an individual's decision to end her life by herself; (3) The right to assisted
suicide, or the right to physician-assisted suicide. Assisted suicide involves an
individual's decision to end her life with the assistance of another. This Article,
chiefly concerned with this right, uses the terms "assisted suicide" and "physician-
assisted suicide" interchangeably; and (4) The right to active voluntary euthanasia.
Active voluntary euthanasia involves an individual's decision to have another
person end her life, e.g., by lethal injection. It differs from assisted suicide in that
the individual whose life is to be ended does not perform the last act causing death.
Suicide, assisted suicide, and active voluntary euthanasia have all been described
as forms of active, as opposed to passive, euthanasia. See id.
Abortion and Assisted Suicide
debate, assisted suicide activists often assert that the right to
assisted suicide is a right to "self-determination."4
But what does the concept of "self-determination" mean in
the context of an individual's decision to commit assisted
suicide? What, for example, is self-determining in the case of
a woman who decides that because a terminal illness may
keep her from living a life in relation to others (for example,
as a daughter, a sister, a wife, or a mother) she would rather
die than live? Why would we think of this woman's decision
to commit assisted suicide as an act of "self-determination"
when the rest of her life, in large measure, has been shaped
(if not determined) for her by society? Why does "self-deter-
mination" become such an important concept when this
woman is about to end her life, but not before? Those who
spearhead the legal fight for recognition of the right to assist-
ed suicide do not address, much less answer, these questions.
They do contend, however, that there is a constitutional basis
for their position.
Proponents of assisted suicide have built their constitution-
al argument on twin pillars. The first is the reasoning of
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health,5 which
recognized a constitutionally protected "liberty interest" in
4. See, e.g., Robert A. Sedler, Are Absolute Bans on Assisted Suicide Constitu-
tional? I Say No, 72 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 725 (1995) [hereinafter Sedler, I Say No];
Robert A. Sedler, Constitutional Challenges to Bans on 'Assisted Suicide": The View
From Without and Within, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 777, 792-93 (1994) [hereinafter
Sedler, Without and Within]; Sedler, Hastening Inevitable Death, supra note 2, at
22. Cf. Todd D. Robichaud, Note, Toward a More Perfect Union: A Federal Cause of
Action for Physician Aid-in-Dying, 27 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 521,534 (1994) (noting that
it is "the freedom from state compulsion which most directly concerns physician aid-
in-dying").
Professor John Robertson has noted that a right to assisted suicide, or at least
physician-assisted suicide, is consistent with the constitutional right to abortion.
John A. Robertson, Cruzan and the Constitutional Status of Nontreatment Decisions
for Incompetent Patients, 25 GA. L. REV. 1139, 1176-77, 1188 (1991) (suggesting that
the logic of Cruzan extends to active euthanasia and is consistent with the right to
abortion in terms of "choice, bodily integrity or other interests of a permanently
comatose patient").
The terms "bodily integrity," "personal autonomy," and "self-determination" are
often used interchangeably in literature on the right to die. Undoubtedly, these
terms overlap to a considerable degree. But the lack of precision with which they
are used by commentators and courts alike suggests that the terms may have lost
their separate meanings, except insofar as they reflect the principle contained in
Justice Brandeis' oft-quoted remark that the "right to be let alone [is] the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men." Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,. dissenting).
5. 497 U.S. 261 (1989).
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refusing unwanted medical treatment.6 The second is the rea-
soning of the Supreme Court's abortion jurisprudence, and
within that body of law, the Court's most significant abortion
opinions: Roe v. Wade' and Planned Parenthood of Southeast-
ern Pennsylvania v. Casey.8 Opponents of assisted suicide
6. Id. at 278-79. The argument that the reasoning of Cruzan requires recogni-
tion of a constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide can be reduced neatly to
the following syllogism: (1) Cruzan recognized that the Constitution protects an
individual's decision to refuse unwanted medical treatment, even when that deci-
sion will result in death. (2) There is no logical distinction between refusing life-
saving medical treatment and physician-assisted suicide because in both cases an
individual's actions set in motion a course of events resulting in death. Therefore,
(3) if the Constitution protects an individual's decision to end her life by refusing
medical treatment, it must also protect an individual's decision to end her life by
committing suicide with a doctor's aid.
For comparisons between passive and active euthanasia, see RONALD DWORKIN,
LIFE'S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM
184 (1993) (calling the distinction between passive and active euthanasia "cruelly
abstract" and suggesting that it leads to "apparently irrational" results); Helga
Kuhse, The Alleged Peril of Active Voluntary Euthanasia: A Reply to Alexander
Morgan Capron, 2 EUTHANASIA REV. 60, 62 (1987) (arguing for both passive and
active euthanasia based on the equal importance of the principle of patient autono-
my in both circumstances); James Rachels, Active and Passive Euthanasia, 292 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 78 (1975) (arguing that the practices are morally indistinguishable).
But see Alexander Morgan Capron, The Right to Die: Progress and Peril, 2 EUTHA-
NASIA REV. 41, 53-59 (1987) (arguing that the logical similarities between passive
and active euthanasia, specifically physician-assisted killing, do not justify extend-
ing the right to include assisted suicide).
7. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
8. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). The argument from the Supreme Court's abortion
jurisprudence has appeared in one of two incarnations. Right-to-die proponents have
argued that a woman's decision to terminate an unwanted pregnancy is analogous to
a terminally ill person's decision to commit physician-assisted suicide. They contend
that if a pregnant woman has a constitutional right to make life-and-death decisions
for what is arguably a separate life-that of the fetus-then that same woman at a
later stage in her life must also have a right to make life and death decisions for
herself. See Sedler, I Say No, supra note 4, at 729.
Alternatively, right-to-die proponents have maintained that if a woman's decision
to terminate an unwanted pregnancy receives special constitutional protection because
of the importance of that decision in a woman's life, an individual's decision to end her
life, which is certainly no less important than the decision whether to carry a preg-
nancy to term, must also receive constitutional protection. See, e.g., Sedler, Hastening
Inevitable Death, supra note 2, at 23; Sedler, I Say No, supra note 4, at 729; Sedler,
Without and Within, supra note 4, at 787.
The analogy between abortion and assisted suicide works in reverse, too. Less than
a year after Roe, opponents of abortion highlighted the analogy between abortion and
euthanasia as an indictment of the perceived constitutional error in Roe. See, e.g.,
Robert M. Byrn, Wade and Bolton: Fundamental Legal Errors and Dangerous Implica-
tions, 19 CATH. LAW. 243, 249-50 (1973), cited in JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., A PRIVATE
CHOicE 32 n.51 (1979).
Assisted suicide advocates press the analogy between abortion and assisted suicide
as if the only comparison could be the one between the relatively broader right to
abortion during the earlier stages of pregnancy and assisted suicide. There is, however,
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have thoroughly considered and rejected the assertion that
constitutional recognition of a right to refuse unwanted med-
ical treatment means that there is also a constitutional right
to physician-assisted suicide. By comparison, the impact of
Supreme Court abortion jurisprudence has not received much
attention at all.9
This Article evaluates the comparisons between abortion
and assisted suicide advanced in the recent discourse sur-
rounding the right to die. It argues that the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence, particularly its abortion jurisprudence, does not
establish a constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide.
Part I notes that there has been serious confusion about how
to characterize the right to physician-assisted suicide, and
attempts to explain why assisted suicide is a "fundamental"
right or merely a "constitutionally protected liberty interest."
Part I concludes by providing a framework, consistent with
current Supreme Court doctrine, within which to analyze the
claimed right to assisted suicide. Part II considers the legal
arguments in support of the right to physician-assisted sui-
cide. It explores the scope of the model of "personal autonomy"
that assisted suicide proponents advance, and criticizes this
model as being both overbroad and discredited by current
constitutional doctrine. Part III explains a number of distinc-
tions between abortion and assisted suicide. It concludes that,
based upon these distinctions, courts should reject the claim
no a priori reason why this must be so. If abortion and assisted suicide are to be
analogized at all one could defensibly adhere to the position that the proper analogy
between the two practices is the one between the relatively narrow right to abortion
during the later stages of pregnancy and assisted suicide.
9. In fact, until now only one commentator has devoted a law review article
exclusively to the relationship between abortion and assisted suicide. See Seth F.
Kreimer, Does Pro-Choice Mean Pro-Kevorkian? An Essay on Roe and Casey and the
Right to Die, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 803 (1995). A number of articles, however, mention
the analogy between the two rights, both in support of the analogy, see, e.g., Sedler,
Hastening Inevitable Death, supra note 2, at 23; Sedler, I Say No, supra note 4, at
729; Sedler, Without and Within, supra note 4, at 786-87; and against, see, e.g.,
Yale Kamisar, Against Assisted Suicide-Even a Very Limited Form, 72 U. DET.
MERCY L. REV. 735, 760-68 (1995); Thomas J. Marzen, "Out, Out Brief Candle":
Constitutionally Prescribed Suicide for the Terminally Ill, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
799, 805, 822-23 (1994); Willard C. Shih, Note, Assisted Suicide, the Due Process
Clause and "Fidelity in Translation," 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1245, 1260 (1995)
(explaining that the history of the right to abortion differs from that of assisted
suicide and distinguishing assisted suicide from abortion on the grounds that (a)
assisted suicide falls outside the category of fundamental rights the Supreme Court
found to be protected by the right to privacy and (b) that assisted suicide, unlike
abortion, involves termination of a person's life).
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that the federal Constitution protects a right to physician-
assisted suicide, even where the terminally ill are concerned.
The Conclusion offers some final remarks.
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
This Part sets out to provide the proper framework within
which courts should consider the question whether the federal
Constitution protects a right to assisted suicide. The discus-
sion is divided into three subsections. Part I.A considers the
different ways in which proponents of the right to assisted
suicide have characterized that right, and attributes such
inconsistency to the shifting ground of the Supreme Court's
substantive due process jurisprudence. Part I.A concludes by
suggesting that, if the right to assisted suicide is protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause at all, the
right can only plausibly be termed a constitutionally protected
"liberty interest." Part I.B lays out the framework within
which courts should analyze the right to assisted suicide. Part
I.C proposes some tentative answers to a few questions raised
in the preceding discussion. It concludes by identifying the
central issue considered in the remainder of the Article.
A. The Uncertain State of Non-Textually-Based
Constitutional "Liberty"
Because the right to assisted suicide is not expressly men-
tioned in the text of the Constitution, proponents of that right
have had to rely on arguments based on existing Supreme
Court doctrine to explain why it is a right of constitutional
dimensions. The most common and colorable argument made
to date is that state laws banning assisted suicide impermis-
sibly infringe upon the "liberty" guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause."0
10. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text. Some commentators advance a
First Amendment argument in proposing a constitutional right to commit assisted
suicide. See, e.g., Matthew P. Previn, Assisted Suicide and Religion: Conflicting
Conceptions of the Sanctity of Human Life, 84 GEO. L.J. 589 (1996).
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Those who invoke the Constitution's liberty guarantee,
however, have not been able to agree on the nature of the
asserted liberty. In its various forms, the right to assisted
suicide has been defined as a "fundamental" right," a "liberty
interest, " 12 an aspect of "liberty,"3 and an aspect of the "right
to privacy." 4 If, as assisted suicide advocates evidently be-
lieve, it is clear that the Constitution protects the right to
assisted suicide, it is difficult to understand why that right
has not been defined with a greater degree of consistency. 5 In
all fairness to those who cannot agree on the proper constitu-
tional term with which to refer to the right to assisted suicide,
the Supreme Court's substantive due process jurisprudence
has been anything but a model of clarity.
Once upon a time, the theory of Fourteenth Amendment
substantive due process rights was a simple matter. For the
quarter century between the Supreme Court's first modern
substantive due process decision, Griswold v. Connecticut,"
and the Court's decision in Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services, 7 in order to assert that a certain decision an indi-
vidual might make was an aspect of the liberty safeguarded by
the Due Process Clause, one argued that the decision was
fundamental and, therefore, protected by the right to privacy.' 8
Accordingly, during the heyday of "fundamental-rights-
think," when two of our country's most well-respected consti-
tutional law scholars, Professors Laurence Tribe and Kathleen
11. See, e.g., Sedler, Without and Within, supra note 4, at 780-90 (describing
"the choice to hasten inevitable death" as a "fundamental right").
12. See, e.g., Sedler, Hastening Inevitable Death, supra note 2, at 20 (claiming
that "an absolute ban on the use of physician-prescribed medications by a terminal-
ly ill person to hasten that person's inevitable death ... is an 'undue burden' on the
person's [protected] 'liberty' interest").
13. See, e.g., Sedler, I Say No, supra note 4, at 728 (describing the right as
embodied in the "liberty" protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause).
14. See, e.g., Sedler, Without and Within, supra note 4, at 788-89 (arguing that
the right to assisted suicide is "fundamental" and protected as an aspect of the
constitutional right to privacy).
15. For a description of the Rehnquist Court's treatment of the right to privacy
and its substitution of constitutionally protected liberty interests, see Mark A.
Racanelli, Note, Reversals: Privacy and the Rehnquist Court, 81 GA. L. REV. 443,
470-72, 473 (1992).
16. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (recognizing a constitutional right to privacy).
17. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
18. Cf David M. Smolin, The Jurisprudence of Privacy in a Splintered Supreme
Court, 75 MARQ. L. REV. 975, 976 (1992) (using the terms "substantive due process"
and "right of privacy" interchangeably).
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Sullivan, argued in Bowers v. Hardwick19 that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protected the decision
of two adult men to engage in consensual sodomy, they based
their argument on the theory that the decision was fundamen-
tal and protected by the right to privacy.2 °
Were Tribe and Sullivan to argue Hardwick today, they
would have to navigate a considerably more difficult constitu-
tional terrain. 2 Gone are the days when one could argue by
analogy to the Court's earlier right-to-privacy cases that to
engage in consensual same-sex sodomy was a fundamental
right encompassed by the right to privacy. Several years after
it decided Hardwick, beginning with Webster,22 the Supreme
Court embraced a notion of substantive due process rights
that, in some very important respects, looked considerably
unlike the right to privacy.
Delivering a plurality opinion in Webster,23 Chief Justice
Rehnquist launched a frontal assault on the right to privacy
and the protection it offered a woman's right to abortion. Har-
kening back to the Court's experience of applying Roe v.
Wade,24 the Chief Justice explained:
Justice Blackmun takes us to task for our failure to join
in a "great issues" debate as to whether the Constitution
includes an "unenumerated" general right to privacy as
recognized in such cases as Griswold v. Connecticut ...
and Roe. But Griswold v. Connecticut, unlike Roe, did not
purport to adopt a whole framework, complete with de-
tailed rules and distinctions, to govern the cases in which
the asserted liberty interest would apply. As such, it was
far different from the opinion, if not the holding, of Roe v.
19. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
20. See id. at 190 (noting with disapproval that Hardwick and the respondents
and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit took the position
that the "[Supreme] Court's prior cases have construed the Constitution to confer a
right of privacy that extends to homosexual sodomy").
21. Shortly before this Article was published, the Supreme Court struck down
an amendment to the Colorado Constitution that prohibited local or state govern-
mental action designed to protect lesbians, gay men, or bisexuals. Romer v. Evans,
116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996). The Court did not mention its ruling in Bowers v. Hardwick,
478 U.S. 186 (1986). Although Romer restricts the reach and relevance of Hardwick,
nothing in Romer suggests that Hardwick's central holding has lost its force as a
matter of constitutional law.
22. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
23. Id.
24. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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Wade, which sought to establish a constitutional frame-
work for judging state regulation of abortion during the
entire term of pregnancy .... The experience of the Court
in applying Roe v. Wade in later cases . . .suggests to us
that there is wisdom in not unnecessarily attempting to
elaborate the abstract differences between a "fundamental
right" to abortion ... a "limited fundamental constitutional
right,".., or a liberty interest protected by the Due Process
Clause, which we believe it to be.2 5
The Chief Justice's theory26 that the right to abortion should
be considered a "liberty interest protected by the due process
clause" rather than a "fundamental" constitutional right,
rocked the seemingly well-established and secure foundations
of the Court's abortion jurisprudence.27 Several Supreme Court
Terms passed before a majority of the Court addressed the
argument made by the Chief Justice, and adoption of the Chief
Justice's theory did not come without a fight.
25. Webster, 492 U.S. at 520 (plurality opinion) (citations omitted) (emphasis
added).
26. The Chief Justice's theory did not capture a majority of the Court; the Chief
Justice spoke only for himself and Justices White and Kennedy in this regard. See
Peggy S. McClard, The Freedom of Choice Act: Will the Constitution Allow It?, 30
Hous. L. REV. 2041, 2048-49 (1994).
27. The Chief Justice remarked: "There is no doubt that our holding today will
allow some governmental regulation of abortion that would have been prohibited
under the language of such cases as Coluatti v. Franklin and Akron v. Akron Center
for Reproductive Health, Inc." Webster, 492 U.S. at 520-21 (citations omitted).
For further discussion of the impact of the Webster plurality, see Colin Meeder,
Recent Publication, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 273, 280 (1996) (reviewing JAMES F.
SIMON, THE CENTER HOLDS: THE POWER STRUGGLE INSIDE THE REHNQUIST COURT (1995))
(describing Webster as "the first serious threat to Roe"); Mark H. Woltz, A Bold
Reaffirmation? Planned Parenthood v. Casey Opens the Door for States to Enact New
Laws to Discourage Abortion, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1787, 1803 (1993) (calling Webster "a
turning point" in the Court's treatment of abortion cases); Natalie Wright, State
Abortion Law After Casey: Finding "Adequate and Independent" Grounds for Choice
in Ohio, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 891, 896 (1993) (calling the Chief Justice's view that the
abortion right should be defined as a constitutionally protected "liberty interest" a
'significant" change from prior Supreme Court jurisprudence); Calvin R. Massey, The
Locus of Sovereignty: Judicial Review, Legislative Supremacy and Federalism in the
Constitutional Traditions of Canada and the United States, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1229,
1274 (taking the view that Webster "heralds a new era"); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION:
THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 23 (1992) (suggesting that although Webster was joined only
by a plurality it represents "an open invitation to state legislation" to test the limits
of permissible regulations). But see Daniel A. Farber & John E. Nowak, Beyond the
Roe Debate: Judicial Experience with the 1980s "Reasonableness" Test, 76 VA. L. REV.
519, 533-38 (1990) (discussing what the authors deem "the Irrelevance of the Funda-
mental Rights Debate").
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From one end of the ideological spectrum, Justice Scalia, in
a separate concurrence in Webster, took aim at the Chief
Justice's opinion for not going far enough.2" Justice Scalia
remarked that the majority's contrivance to avoid overturning
Roe explicitly once and for all was a far worse possibility than
leaving Roe to languish, or to "be disassembled doorjamb by
doorjamb."29
From the opposite end of the spectrum, Justice Blackmun,
in his opinion, passionately defended Roe and the abortion
right,3" yet Justice Blackmun made no explicit mention of the
Chief Justice's attempt to reclassify the abortion right as a
liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. "Today,"
he wrote, "Roe v. Wade ... and the fundamental constitutional
right of women to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy,
survive but are not secure."31 Elsewhere in his opinion, Justice
Blackmun referred to the abortion choice as "a limited funda-
mental constitutional right to decide whether to terminate a
pregnancy."3 2
Justice Blackmun's failure to register expressly his disagree-
ment with the Chief Justice's definition of the abortion right
as a "liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause" is
puzzling.33 After all, Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion flat-
footedly rejected Justice Blackmun's characterization of the
right to abortion as either a "fundamental constitutional
right," or "a limited fundamental constitutional right."34
Less than a year after the Court decided Webster, it again
divided on whether it was wiser to avoid elaborating the
abstract differences between "fundamental" rights, "limited
fundamental" rights, and constitutionally protected "liberty
interests." In that case, Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Depart-
ment of Health,35 Chief Justice Rehnquist, again writing for
the majority, assumed without deciding that "the United
States Constitution would grant a competent person a consti-
tutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and
28. Webster, 492 U.S. at 532 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
29. See id. at 537.
30. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
31. Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
32. Id. at 555 (emphasis added).
33. Id. at 520.
34. Id.
35. 497 U.S. 261 (1989).
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nutrition. 3 6 The opinion observed that "[a]lIthough many state
courts have held that a right to refuse treatment is encom-
passed by a generalized constitutional right of privacy, we
have never so held. We believe this issue is more properly ana-
lyzed in terms of a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest."
3 7
Dissenting in that case, Justice Brennan wrote that if
Cruzan had the constitutional right the Court assumed she
had-for the reasons the Court assumed she had it-then that
right had to be fundamental. Using the word "fundamental" no
fewer than fourteen times, Justice Brennan argued that "if a
competent person has a liberty interest to be free of unwanted
medical treatment, as both the majority and Justice O'Connor
concede, it must be fundamental."" Although Justice
Brennan's observation would have had force a decade, or even
a few years earlier,39 after Webster the chord struck by the
observation began to ring out of tune.
It was not until the Supreme Court made its most recent
pronouncement on the right to abortion in Planned Parenthood
of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey4 ° that the Supreme
Court finally abandoned the "fundamental rights" language of
its earlier privacy and abortion jurisprudence in favor of the
"liberty interest" language of the Webster plurality. Nowhere
in the joint opinion that carried the day in Casey, for example,
did the authors describe the abortion right-or any other
privacy rights-in their own words as "fundamental."41 Specifi-
cally, as to the abortion right, it is carefully called a "liberty,"
42
or an aspect of "bodily integrity,"43 or an exercise of "personal
autonomy."
44
36. Id. at 279.
37. Id. at 279 n.7 (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194-95 (1986)). Al-
though Hardwick, a case decided on privacy grounds, is arguably irrelevant to a
discussion of a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest in physician-assisted suicide,
the Cruzan Court's reference to Hardwick illustrates why such a view is mistaken.
38. Id. at 304 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
39. As the Cruzan majority seemed to concede, the right at issue in Cruzan could
have been analyzed as a "fundamental right" protected by the right to privacy rather
than as a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest. Id. at 279 n.7. See supra note 37
and accompanying text.
40. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
41. Id. (plurality opinion). See also McClard, supra note 26, at 2050 & n.68.
42. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 852 ("Though abortion is conduct, it does not
follow that the State is entitled to proscribe it in all instances. That is because the
liberty of the woman is at stake in a sense unique to the human condition and so
unique to the law.").
43. Id. at 857.
44: Id. ("Roe, however, may be seen not only as an exemplar of Griswold liberty
but as a rule (whether or not mistaken) of personal autonomy and bodily integri-
ty. . . ."). Even Justice Blackmun's separate opinion in Casey demonstrated
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Casey's teaching, however subject to conjecture it might
otherwise be, is not open to doubt on one point: the three
Justices who authored the joint opinion were not alone in
taking the view that the right to abortion was now to be
considered a Fourteenth Amendment "liberty interest," and
not an aspect of the "fundamental" right to privacy. In total,
seven Justices approved of this characterization of the right to
abortion .5
That the Supreme Court no longer considers the right to
abortion to be a "fundamental," "very fundamental," or "lim-
ited fundamental" right, and that the Court never considered
the decision to refuse unwanted medical treatment to be such
a right, provide an important lesson where the right to as-
sisted suicide is concerned. Because assisted suicide enthusi-
asts rest their constitutional claims on Casey and Cruzan,
any right to assisted suicide cannot be correctly characterized
as a "fundamental" right-at least if one is speaking of the
right in constitutional terms.46 Like the rights involved in
Cruzan and Casey, the most that could be said of any right to
assisted suicide is that it is a Fourteenth Amendment "liberty
interest."
inconsistency, characterizing the abortion right alternatively as an aspect of the
'rights of privacy and bodily integrity," id. at 926 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part,
concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part), an example of "bodily
integrity," id. at 927, a "liberty right," id. at 940, and a "fundamental libert[y]," id.
at 943.
45. The seven include the authors of the Casey joint opinion-Justices O'Connor,
Kennedy, and Souter-as well as Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White, Scalia,
and Thomas. See McClard, supra note 26, at 2050.
46. Undoubtedly, talk of fundamental rights will be appropriate outside the
abortion context. Even after Casey, courts may consider as fundamental those rights
contained in the Bill of Rights that have been applied to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. It is less certain, however, whether
other rights will be judged similarly in light of Casey. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 950-53
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring and dissenting) (asserting that the right to an abortion
is not "fundamental"). Cf Racanelli, supra note 15, at 468 (implying that if a right
can be found in the text of the Constitution or in the history of our country, it may
be fundamental). Thus, the question remains whether the Casey Court's refusal to
speak about abortion as a 'fundamental right" will require the Court to redefine as
"Fourteenth Amendment liberty interests" all other privacy rights previously
protected as fundamental.
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B. The Framework for Analyzing Fourteenth
Amendment "Liberty Interest" Cases
The irreducible minimum of a substantive due process chal-
lenge requires that a litigant overcome two hurdles. First, he
must establish that a challenged law touches on some "liberty
interest" protected by the Due Process Clause.47 Second, he
must show that the challenged law impermissibly infringes
the asserted "liberty interest." For the moment, this Article
addresses initially the second hurdle.
In determining whether a law adequately accommodates a
constitutionally protected "liberty interest," courts engage in
a form of constitutional balancing, pitting the individual's
protected "liberty interest" against the state's justification for
passing the challenged law.48
The Casey joint opinion, however, filled in the details about
how courts are to balance an individual's liberty interest
against a state's interests in order to determine whether an
individual's due process liberty interest has been violated by
state law.49 Casey explained that not every law that imposes
a burden on an individual's constitutionally protected rights
is, by definition, unconstitutional.5" A state may restrict the
exercise of a Fourteenth Amendment "liberty interest" if the
restriction-whether designed to do so or not-does not place
an undue burden on the right. The Casey opinion adopted
this "undue burden" standard and explained it as follows:
The fact that a law which serves a valid purpose, one not
designed to strike at the right itself, has the incidental
effect of making it more difficult or more expensive to
procure an abortion cannot be enough to invalidate it.
47. This assertion will be discussed later in the Article. See infra notes 65-71
and accompanying text.
48. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990) (citing
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982), and Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291,
299 (1982)).
49. Casey, 505 U.S. at 979-80 (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting) (opining
that a woman's power to have an abortion is not a constitutional liberty interest).
The law will survive constitutional attack so long as it is rationally related to a
legitimate governmental purpose. Id at 981.
50. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 873 (explaining that "not every law which makes a
right more difficult to exercise is, ipso facto, an infringement of that right").
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Only where the state regulation imposes an undue bur-
den on a woman's ability to make this decision does the
power of the state reach into the heart of the liberty pro-
tected by the Due Process Clause.5'
Because the joint opinion elaborated upon the undue
burden standard in the context of ruling on state-imposed
restrictions on the abortion decision,52 some judicial opinions
have taken the position that that standard does not apply
outside of that context.53 There is nothing inherently self-
limiting about the "undue burden" standard, however, to
preclude its application to Fourteenth Amendment liberty
interests generally.54
The question is not, as some courts seem to have assumed,
whether the undue burden standard will apply (or already
does) outside of the abortion context, but rather, it is whether
a majority of the Court will adopt it as the standard by which
state laws circumscribing the exercise of constitutional liber-
ty interests will be measured.55 Whatever action a majority of
51. Id.
52. Id. at 874-76. The joint opinion summarized the meaning of "undue
burden" in this context: "A finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for the
conclusion that a state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial
obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus." Id. at
877. A statute that placed an "undue burden" on the right to abortion would be
invalid, the joint opinion explained, "because the means chosen by the State to
further the interest in potential life must be calculated to inform the woman's free
choice, not hinder it." Id.
53. In particular it is noteworthy that some courts that have considered wheth-
er there is a constitutional due process right to commit assisted suicide have not
adhered to Casey's framework, including its undue burden standard, at all. See
Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 798-99 (9th Cir. 1996) (adopting
a balancing test to measure the constitutionality of Washington's ban on assisted
suicide).
54. As Professor Sheldon Gelman explains, "The Casey Court ... did not
explicitly confine the undue burden test to peripheral applications of Roe or to
questions about the scope of abortion rights." See Sheldon Gelman, "Life" and
"Liberty" Their Original Meaning, Historical Antecedents, and Current Significance
in the Debate Over Abortion Rights, 78 MINN. L. REV. 585, 609 (1994).
55. The undue burden standard announced in Casey did not capture a majority
of the Court. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 930 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (explaining that no Court majority has ever agreed upon a
standard of review different from strict scrutiny where state limitations on repro-
ductive choice are concerned). Id. at 964 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (same); McClard, supra note 26, at 2051 ("The portion of the
Casey opinion outlining the new [undue burden] standard of review was joined only
by the two co-authors."). It is doubtful that the rational basis test favored by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and other Justices will prevail. A majority of the Court consis-
tently has favored a standard of review that is at least as rigorous as the undue
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the Court ultimately takes on the undue burden standard, it
is currently prevailing doctrine. 56 Courts must then determine
whether an undue burden has been placed on a protected
liberty interest where a state law has the purpose or effect of
placing a "substantial obstacle" in the path of an individual
who wishes to exercise such an interest.5 7 Where a state law
does not place an undue burden on a protected liberty interest,
the law must be upheld, provided that the legislature had a
rational basis for enacting it. 58
The finding that a state law does place an undue burden on
a protected liberty interest will not always demand that the law
be declared unconstitutional. Such a conclusion will depend
upon the strength of the state's interests in enacting or main-
taining the law. If the state's interest is only "legitimate," the
law must fall.59 If, however, the state can demonstrate "compel-
ling" reasons to support the law, the law must be upheld.6 °
Indeed, where a state's interests supporting the law are compel-
ling, the state may go so far as to ban the exercise of the liberty
interest altogether-so long as the law does not reach farther
than necessary to serve the state's interest.
61
burden standard. See G. Sidney Buchanan, A Very Rational Court, 30 HoUS. L. REV.
1509, 1570 (1993) (arguing that the Court will not adopt a standard of review less
strict than the undue burden standard).
56. See City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Pub. Co., 486 U.S. 750, 764 n.9 (1988)
(announcing that settled Supreme Court jurisprudence holds that "when no single
rationale commands a majority, 'the holding of the Court may be viewed as that
position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgmen[t] on the narrowest
grounds'") (quoting Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977)). See also
Robert D. Goldstein, Reading Casey: Structuring the Woman's Decisionmaking
Process, 4 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 787, 789 & n.6 (1966) (noting that the Casey
joint opinion establishes current doctrine).
57. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 877-78; supra note 52 and accompanying text.
58. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 878 (ruling that unless a law has the effect of placing an
undue burden on the right to abortion, "a state measure designed to persuade [a woman]
to choose childbirth over abortion will be upheld if reasonably related to that goal.").
59. See id.
60. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 932 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
61. Though bans on abortion constitute a burden on the right to abortion, they
are constitutional where a state has a compelling interest. As the Casey joint opinion
observed:
We also affirm Roe's holding that "subsequent to viability, the State in pro-
moting its interest in the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate,
and even proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate
medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother."
Casey, 505 U.S. at 879 (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973)).
Under the undue burden standard a state may ban the exercise of a constitution-
ally protected liberty interest, so long as the state has a compelling interest in
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With this framework in mind, this Article now returns to the
first hurdle that a litigant maintaining a substantive due
process challenge must clear, namely, establishing that an
asserted liberty interest is constitutionally protected. At the
outset of the following brief discussion, it bears mentioning
that it is well beyond the scope of this Article to survey the
numerous sources of judgment that may properly be thought
to play a role in deciding that a certain liberty interest is (or
is not) one of constitutional dimensions.62
Broadly speaking, there are two sorts of Fourteenth Amend-
ment liberty interests. On the one hand, liberty interests
based on state-created law are defined ultimately with refer-
ence to the law, rule, ordinance, contract, or regulation that
established them. 3 On the other hand are liberty interests
grounded in the Constitution itself. Within this category, one
can count the liberty interest in abortion and the liberty
enacting the law, the law furthers the state's interest, and the law is drawn narrow-
ly to serve that interest. See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 828 (1986) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (applying strict
scrutiny for abortion restrictions that do place an undue burden on the right to
abortion and applying rational basis scrutiny for restrictions that do not), overruled
by Casey, 505 U.S. 833. This is simple enough: If a law survives strict scrutiny, it will
always pass constitutional muster. Whether a law blotting out a constitutionally
protected liberty interest can survive constitutional challenge only if it passes strict
scrutiny is still something of an open question. For example, the Court might uphold
such a law if a state's interest is less than compelling, or it might uphold the law
even if it is not tailored narrowly to serve the state's interest, or both. Professor
Robertson thought that "any reasonable state interest, or at least one which does not
impose an 'undue burden,' would justify state interference with [a Fourteenth
Amendment] liberty." See Robertson, supra note 4, at 1174 n.132. Since Robertson
wrote those words, however, the constitutional landscape has changed enough so that
the context in which he is correct has begun to come more clearly into focus: Casey
and other cases flesh out when a reasonable or legitimate state interest will be
enough to outweigh a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest and when it probably
will not.
62. For discussion of the theory of judicial review, see Terrance Sandalow,
Constitutional Interpretation, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1033 (1981), and JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
63. See, e.g., Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2300 (1995) (recognizing that
"States may under certain circumstances create liberty interests which are protected
by the Due Process Clause," but holding that
these interests will be generally limited to freedom from restraint which, while
not exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to
protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force ... nonetheless imposes
atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary
incidents of prison life).
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interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment. If a liberty
interest in committing assisted suicide does exist, it will be
(like abortion and refusal of medical treatment) grounded in
the Constitution itself.
64
Courts may consider a number of factors in determining
whether a certain decision constitutes a liberty interest
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Courts may look,
for example, to the common law to determine whether a
decision has been recognized historically as within the realm
of individual choice. 5 If it has, then the decision may be a
liberty interest of constitutional dimensions. Thus, when the
Supreme Court, in Cruzan, assumed that the Constitution
protected an individual's decision to refuse lifesaving medical
treatment, it relied heavily on the fact that the decision's
"logical corollary," the right to informed consent,66 was well
64. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 793-94, 838 (9th Cir.
1996) (en banc) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause
includes a liberty interest to choose the time and manner of one's own death). But see
Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 723-25 (2d Cir. 1996) (rejecting the claim that there is
a due process liberty interest in committing assisted suicide).
65. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1989)
(taking account of the common law of informed consent to establish the constitu-
tional pedigree of a right to refuse unwanted medical treatment). A related inquiry
might be made into the number of states outlawing the conduct claimed to be
constitutionally protected at the time the court decides. Or, instead, courts may look
to the number of states that prohibited the conduct in question at the time of the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.
66. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 270. The Chief Justice's majority opinion in Cruzan
ignored the fact that the history of informed consent, and, indeed, the right of a
competent adult to refuse unwanted lifesaving medical treatment, even if constitu-
tionally protected, did not (without more) justify the conclusion that Nancy Cruzan
enjoyed and could exercise such rights. Nancy Cruzan was not a competent
adult-at least not at any time when her case was moving its way through the
courts. For the Court to conclude that Nancy Cruzan had a right when she was
competent to decide the future course of her life, including a time when she might
no longer be competent, required a considerable leap in constitutional terms.
This opinion seems at odds with the views expressed a year earlier by Justice
Scalia in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1988), which the Chief Justice
purported to embrace. The now-famous footnote six in Michael H. explained that
the Court should define a substantive due process right at "the most specific level at
which a relevant tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right
can be identified." Id. at 127-28 n.6.
Because Chief Justice Rehnquist parted company from Justice Scalia in Cruzan
on the question of how to define the right at issue in that case, one wonders which
Justice was faithful to footnote six. Justice Scalia's approach to the right involved in
Cruzan seems to have adhered more closely to footnote six because the common law
provided no right to refuse unwanted medical treatment but undoubtedly prohibited
suicide. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 294 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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established at common law.6"
Courts may also look to existing case law to determine
whether a judicial consensus has emerged about whether a
particular decision is constitutionally protected. In ruling as
it did, the majority in Cruzan took judicial notice that a sub-
stantial number of lower courts had held that competent
individuals had a protected common law or constitutional
right to refuse unwanted medical treatment.6 8
Finally, courts may use the common law method of consti-
tutional adjudication, or "reasoned judgment," to decide
whether a certain decision is constitutionally protected.6 9 This
67. Note, however, that even the Cruzan Court, which assumed that the right
to passive euthanasia was a constitutionally protected liberty interest did not
suggest that the right to passive euthanasia was either "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty," Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326 (1937), overruled by Benton
v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 793 (1969), or "so rooted in the traditions and conscience
of our people as to be ranked as fundamental." Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97,
105 (1934). By avoiding such language, the Court did not have to address whether
the liberty interest in refusing passive euthanasia was fundamental.
Significantly, by avoiding the fundamental rights language of its previous cases,
the Cruzan Court cast doubt on the continuing vitality of the old touchstones for
defining substantive due process rights. Indeed, given the reasons offered by the
Chief Justice in Webster for not elaborating the abstract differences between
fundamental and other categories of rights, see supra text accompanying notes
26-34, one wonders why the Court would continue to adhere to the tests for deter-
mining fundamental rights set forth in Palko and Snyder.
In light of his stance in Webster, the Chief Justice's suggestion that the Palko
and Snyder tests are still valid is somewhat confusing. Casey, 505 U.S. at 951
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). As the
Chief Justice explained, the tests of Palko and Snyder "are admittedly not precise,
but our decisions implementing this notion of 'fundamental' rights do not afford any
more elaborate basis on which to base such a classification." Id. Reconciling such a
statement with the thrust of his plurality opinion in Webster, see supra text accom-
panying note 25, is difficult.
68. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 271-77. The Cruzan Court cites the following
cases: Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580 (D.R.I. 1988); Conservatorship of Drabick,
245 Cal. Rptr. 840 (Cal. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 958 (1988); Bouvia v.
Superior Ct., 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); Barber v. Superior Ct., 195
Cal. Rptr. 484 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983); McConnell v. Beverly Enterprises-Conn., Inc.,
553 A.2d 596 (Conn. 1989); Corbett v. D'Alessandro, 487 So. 2d 368 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1986); In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292 (Ill. 1987); Brophy v. New
England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E. 2d 626 (Mass. 1986); Superintendent of
Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977); In re Gardner,
534 A.2d 947 (Me. 1987); In re Farrell, 529 A.2d 404 (N.J. 1987); In re Jobes, 529
A.2d 434 (N.J. 1987); In re Peter, 529 A.2d 419 (N.J. 1987); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d
1209 (N.J. 1985); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1967); In re Winchester County
Med. Ctr., 531 N.E.2d 607 (N.Y. 1988); In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y. 1981);
Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E.2d 92 (N.Y. 1914), overruled by Bing
v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3 (N.Y. 1957); In re Grant, 747 P.2d 445 (Wash. 1987).
69. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542-45 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(endorsing reasoned judgment as a guide to determining whether a certain decision
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method requires courts to apply the principle derived from a
line of constitutional cases to the next case that presents
itself. The majority in Cruzan employed a common law ap-
proach when it announced that "[tihe principle that a compe-
tent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in
refusing unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from
our prior decisions."°
By no means an exhaustive list, these sources of judgment
provide courts with a useful starting point to decide whether
a claimed "liberty interest" is protected by the substantive
component of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause. Certainly, because the Supreme Court drew from
these sources of judgment in the two cases upon which assist-
ed suicide proponents chiefly rely, Cruzan and Casey, a court
faced with a constitutional challenge to a state law banning
assisted suicide should not stray too far afield if it faithfully
renders its judgment after undertaking a similar sort of
judicial review.7'
C. Some Final Observations About Substantive
Due Process Jurisprudence
This Part concludes by proposing some tentative answers to
a few questions that arise in light of the preceding discus-
sion. What impact did Casey have on the Court's privacy
cases other than Roe? Can they no longer be understood as
cases involving the right to privacy? Do such cases no longer
involve fundamental rights? Is privacy doctrine dead, or has
it been subsumed by Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest
doctrine? What is the relationship between the privacy cases
already decided and new liberty interest cases as they arise?
is protected by the right to privacy); Casey, 505 U.S. at 849-50 (endorsing reasoned
judgment as a legitimate test to determine whether a right or liberty interest is
constitutionally protected). For a description of the meaning of reasoned judgment
in constitutional interpretation, see ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 26
(1975). For a recent account of the common law method in constitutional adjudication,
see David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV.
877 (1996).
70. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278 (emphasis added).
71. Casey, 505 U.S. at 860-61 (relying on common law and existing case law);
Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 277 (same).
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If Webster and Casey did, indeed, redefine the constitution-
al category within which the right to abortion falls, then it
may be appropriate to assume that Casey's gloss on the right
to abortion applies with equal force to the privacy cases other
than Roe. Because Roe was the last in a line of major
Supreme Court cases to recognize and to apply the constitu-
tional right to privacy, it follows as a matter of principle that
as Roe goes, so goes the rest of the Court's privacy jurispru-
dence.
The Casey joint opinion provides some evidence of having
redefined the rights involved in the Court's pre-Roe privacy
cases as, like the right to abortion, Fourteenth Amendment
liberty interests. This evidence is found in the joint opinion's
silence. Although marriage, procreation, family relationships,
child rearing, and education had long been considered funda-
mental rights, protected by the right to privacy,72 the Casey
joint opinion noticeably failed to characterize such rights
either as fundamental or as being protected by the right to
privacy.
7 3
To be sure, the joint opinion's silence is a thin reed on
which to rest what would amount to a radical departure from
well-established doctrine. Then again, however, Casey's fail-
ure to characterize the rights involved in the Court's earlier
privacy cases as involving fundamental rights or the right to
privacy was itself a radical departure from Supreme Court
precedent.
That said, however, it is by no means a foregone conclusion
that Casey redefined the pre-Roe privacy rights as Four-
teenth Amendment liberty interests. In a future case, the
Court could cut the string binding Roe to its foundation in
the Court's earlier privacy jurisprudence, leaving the earlier
72. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (marriage); Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U.S. 535 (1942) (procreation); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944)
(family relationships); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (child rearing
and education). See also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-91 (1986).
73. The Casey joint opinion only cited cases pre-dating Webster stating that the
rights in those cases were protected because they were fundamental. For example,
in explaining that "[olur law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions
relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing,
and education," Casey, 505 U.S. at 851 (citing Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431
U.S. 678, 685 (1977)), the joint opinion observed that "[o]ur cases recognize 'the
right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmen-
tal intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child.'" Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972)).
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privacy cases to stand as they have since they were decided,
and Roe, as modified by Casey, to stand on its own.
If the Court were inclined to release Roe from the cases to
which it has been tied, it would have a number of arguments
at its disposal. First, the Court might say that because Roe
involves the termination of human "life" it is inherently dif-
ferent from the Court's earlier privacy cases.74 Second, the
Court could note that, unlike some of the earlier cases, Roe
does not involve a form of contraception. 75 And third, the
Court could find that, unlike the rights involved in some of
the earlier privacy cases, our nation has no long-standing
history or tradition recognizing the right to abortion.76 Of
course, the Court could have adopted any of these distinc-
tions, or others, as a means of severing Roe from the Court's
privacy jurisprudence.77 But it did not.
Such distinctions beg the question whether the right to
abortion is really distinguishable from family, marriage, pro-
creation, child rearing, and education. That question, in turn,
begs others: even if the right to abortion could be distinguish-
ed along these lines from the earlier privacy rights, will the
Court ever say so? Could the right to abortion stand on its
own doctrinal footing as a substantive due process right?
Before the Supreme Court resolves such thorny questions
as these, lower courts will be faced with the task of sorting
out the doctrinal confusion created by Casey. In the midst of
this confusion, only one thing seems certain: any attempt to
74. See Brief for the Southern Center for Law & Ethics at 2-3, Planned Parent-
hood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (Nos. 91-744 and 91-902).
Those who make this claim find support in the Court's abortion jurisprudence. See,
e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 324-25 (1980); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159
(1973). The Casey joint opinion sounded the same note, observing that abortion is a
unique act. Casey, 505 U.S. at 852. The Casey joint opinion, however, did not com-
ment upon the uniqueness of the abortion decision as a termination of the fetus'
life. Rather, it stated that abortion is unique "because the liberty of the woman is at
stake in a sense unique to the human condition and so unique to the law." Id.
75. Compare Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (finding that
limitations on contraception conflict with fundamental human rights) with Casey,
505 U.S. at 869 (finding that a woman has a limited constitutional liberty to termi-
nate her pregnancy).
76. See, e.g., Racanelli, supra note 15, at 468, 469 & n. 123 (noting that Rehnquist
suggested that the historical recognition of the rights involved in the Court's privacy
jurisprudence makes Roe distinguishable from the earlier right-to-privacy cases and
referring to Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), which was distinguished on
similar grounds).
77. For a discussion of a possible sex equality distinction between the right to
abortion and the Supreme Court's earlier privacy cases, see infra Part III.B.
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extend the category of non-textually-based Fourteenth Amend-
ment liberty interests-indeed, any attempt to extend the
category of substantive rights protected by the Due Process
Clause-must take account of Casey and the other Fourteenth
Amendment liberty interest cases.78
This observation should not be misunderstood as implying
that the Court's privacy cases (if any remain) are irrelevant
or inapposite where the argument is that a certain decision is
protected as a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest.79 Nor
should it be misunderstood as implying, conversely, that the
Court's Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest cases are
irrelevant or inapposite where the argument is that a certain
decision is protected by a fundamental right to privacy. Still,
one might argue that there is (or should be) some sort of
doctrinal breakwall separating the Court's privacy (or funda-
mental rights) cases from its Fourteenth Amendment liberty
interest cases. Such an argument, however, is far too grudg-
ing and categorical, failing as it does to take account of the
fact that all substantive due process liberties derive from the
same constitutional source: the Due Process Clause's liberty
guarantee. More importantly, such an argument lacks a
doctrinal foundation. The Supreme Court, for example, has
cited privacy cases as authority in its liberty interest deci-
sions.8 o Arguably, then, if the Court were presented with a
new privacy case, it would consider itself equally free to draw
on its liberty interest decisions in reaching and justifying its
conclusions.
78. Nevertheless, proponents of assisted suicide, as well as some courts, continue
to argue that the decision to commit physician-assisted suicide, at least where the
terminally ill are concerned, is fundamental. Two judicial opinions issued recently on
the question of the constitutionality of laws banning assisted suicide, for example,
have employed fundamental rights language. See Quill v. Koppell, 870 F. Supp. 78,
83 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (explaining that plaintiffs argued that "Roe and Casey are broad
enough to establish that there is a fundamental right on the part of the terminally
ill patient to decide to end his life, and to do so with the type of assistance described
in this case'); State v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714, 729-30 (Mich. 1994) (stating that
Casey does not stand for the proposition that the Due Process Clause protects a
fundamental right to assisted suicide). But see Compassion in Dying v. Washington,
79 F.3d 790, 816 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (holding that an individual has a "due
process liberty interest in controlling the time and manner of one's death").
79. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 n.7 (1989)
(citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194-95 (1986)); Casey, 505 U.S. at 834
(citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)).
80. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 849 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973); Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977)).
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This Part has explained that proponents of a right to
assisted suicide use various constitutional terms to describe
the right. This Part has argued that the inconsistencies in
their description can be attributed in part to the changes that
have taken place in the Supreme Court's substantive due
process jurisprudence. It reasoned that because the right to
abortion and the right to refuse unwanted but lifesaving
medical treatment are both considered Fourteenth Amend-
ment liberty interests, any right to assisted suicide must be
similarly described. This Part also sets forth the framework
within which courts should analyze the claim that there is a
Fourteenth Amendment "liberty interest" in committing
assisted suicide. In light of this discussion, the remainder of
this Article deals with a very narrow question: Is there a
Fourteenth Amendment "liberty interest" in committing sui-
cide with a physician's assistance?8 This Article suggests
that for a variety of reasons the answer is "no."
II. EXISTENCE OF A "LIBERTY INTEREST"
IN PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE
This Part of the Article scrutinizes assisted suicide advo-
cates' contention that the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment broadly protects an individual's right to
self-determination or personal autonomy, including a
terminally ill person's decision to commit physician-assisted
suicide. This Part lays out the model of personal autonomy
contained in assisted suicide advocates' contention. It then
criticizes this model on the ground that it is broader than
any conception of self-determination or personal autonomy
the Supreme Court has ever recognized. It concludes by
arguing that, consonant with current Supreme Court
doctrine, courts should reject the model of personal autonomy
81. Applying this framework, extracted from existing Supreme Court doctrine,
to the claimed constitutionally protected liberty interest to commit assisted suicide,
several questions arise. First, does the Constitution protect the decision to commit
physician-assisted suicide as a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest? Second, if
so, does an absolute ban on assisted suicide amount to an "undue burden' on the
right? Third, if the answer to either the first or second question is "no," does the
state have any legitimate reason for enacting the ban? Finally, if the answer to the
first two questions is "yes," are the state's interests in enacting such a prohibition
sufficiently important to justify the burden?
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on which the liberty interest in committing assisted suicide is
based, as well as the liberty interest in committing assisted
suicide itself.
A. Problem of Principles: The Imperfect
Model of Personal Autonomy
1. The "Personal Autonomy Model"--Advocates of the
right to assisted suicide maintain that because the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects a wom-
an's decision to terminate her pregnancy, then it must also
protect the decision of one who is terminally ill to commit
physician-assisted suicide." The theoretical foundation of
this argument is a very broad reading of the Supreme Court's
explication of the right to bodily integrity or personal autono-
my in Roe and Casey. This Article refers to such a reading of
Supreme Court doctrine as the "personal autonomy model."
The model can be summarized as follows.
The Constitution protects a woman's right to have an abor-
tion, despite the unmistakable effect of the exercise of that
right on the potential life of a fetus, because the Due Process
Clause safeguards liberty and because the essence of liberty
is personal autonomy. 3 As assisted suicide activist Professor
Robert Sedler has argued, "This means that a person has the
right to bodily integrity, to control his or her own body, and
to define his or her own existence."84 Accordingly, the protec-
tion afforded the right to abortion indicates that one has a
constitutional right to make "self-defining" decisions that
result in the termination of life. 5
If so, right-to-die advocates argue that this right cannot be
limited to a pregnant woman's decision to obtain an
82. See, e.g., Sedler, Hastening Inevitable Death, supra note 2, at 23; Sedler, I
Say No, supra note 4, at 728; Sedler, Without and Within, supra note 4, at 786-87.
See also Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1996), affd, 79
F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc); State v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714 (Mich.
1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1795 (1995).
83. See, e.g., Sedler, I Say No, supra note 4, at 729; Sedler, Without and Within,
supra note 4, at 784.
84. Sedler, Hastening Inevitable Death, supra note 2, at 23.
85. Id.
Abortion and Assisted Suicide
abortion.86 A terminally ill individual 8' has a right to person-
al autonomy that guarantees her, like a pregnant woman, the
right to control her own body and to make important decisions
defining her own existence, including how and when to die.
Sedler reasons:
Surely, if a woman's right to control over her own body
includes the right to have an abortion, when that same
woman at a later stage of her life becomes terminally ill,
her right to control her own body must include her right
to make decisions about the voluntary termination of her
own life during the end stages of her terminal illness.88
According to this argument, the right to personal autonomy
protects a terminally ill individual's decision to commit physi-
cian-assisted suicide.89 Indeed, a terminally ill individual may
have a stronger due process argument for a right to die than a
pregnant woman has for a right to abortion; after all, the
body- and destiny-controlling decision of a terminally ill indi-
vidual directly affects only the decision maker and not, as with
abortion, a third party.
2. Problems with the Personal Autonomy Model-The
personal autonomy model proves too much. The model rests
on a far-reaching constitutional principle that an individual
has a constitutionally protected "liberty" to do with her body
as she wishes and to shape her destiny as she pleases, espe-
cially where that decision neither results in the death of a
third party or otherwise clearly and directly harms a third
person. Unfortunately for those who adhere to such a view,
86. See id.
87. This Article uses the example of the terminally ill individual here because
it is the example assisted suicide proponents presently give. But see Kamisar, supra
note 3, at 234-40; Marzen, supra note 9, at 802-03 (arguing that the right to
assisted suicide, once established, cannot long be limited to the terminally ill, in
part because of the difficulty in defining "terminally ill").
Recent evidence of this proposition surfaced in the litigation over the constitu-
tionality of Oregon's referendum, Measure 16, which legalized the practice of physi-
cian-assisted suicide under certain circumstances. In defending the referendum,
assisted suicide proponents explained that 'Measure 16 is only the first step toward
legalizing physician assisted suicide for others who consent." Lee v. Oregon, 891 F.
Supp. 1429, 1432 (D. Or. 1995) (footnote omitted).
88. Sedler, I Say No, supra note 4, at 729.
89. See id.
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the Fourteenth Amendment did not enact John Stuart
Mill's Harm Principle.9'
If the Constitution protected every right supported by the
principle contained in the personal autonomy model, states
could not regulate a broad range of conduct currently thought
90. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 68 (1973) (explaining that
the Constitution does not enact Mill's political theory), cert. denied, 418 U.S. 939
(1974); Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 740 (2d Cir. 1996) (Calabresi, J., concurring) ("In
other words, our Constitution does not enact the bodily equivalent of Herbert
Spencer's Social Statics.") (internal citation omitted).
There are similarities between the principle contained in the personal autonomy
model and the "Harm Principle" first suggested by John Stuart Mill. JOHN STUART
MILL, ON LIBERTY (David Spitz ed., 1975). Even if the Constitution were thought to
enact John Stuart Mill's "Harm Principle," there is substantial support for the view
that Mill's theory of liberty would not include the liberty to end one's life.
Professor David Spitz has argued that "what Mill sought to protect was man's
permanent freedom of voluntary choice...." David Spitz, Freedom and Individuality
in Mill's Liberty in Retrospect, in MILL, supra, at 229. This argument led Professor
Spitz to conclude that if, as Mill believed, one does not have the liberty to sell
oneself into slavery, a fortiori one cannot have the liberty to commit suicide. Id. Nor
could it support the argument that one has a right to commit assisted suicide.
Consider Mill's treatment of the relationship between liberty and slavery and the
reasons he gives for rejecting the claim that one has the liberty to sell oneself into
slavery. Mill begins his discussion of this topic by noting that in most civilized
countries one cannot sell oneself into slavery. Mill observes that ordinarily the
reason for not interfering with one's voluntary acts is "consideration for [an individ-
ual's] liberty." MILL, supra, at 95. In the case of selling oneself into slavery, however,
one's "voluntary act" amounts to an abdication of liberty itself; by doing so, one
"foregoes any future use of [liberty] beyond that single act." Id. One who sells
oneself into slavery "therefore defeats, in his own case, the very purpose which is
the justification of allowing [him] to dispose of himself." Id. Thus, Mill concludes,
"The principle of freedom cannot require that he should be free not to be free. It is
not freedom to be allowed to alienate his freedom." Id.
Mill did not intend that his argument against slavery would be limited to that
single case: "These reasons, the force of which is so conspicuous in this peculiar case
[of slavery], are evidently of far wider application. . . ." Id. Suicide and assisted
suicide, and for that matter, active voluntary euthanasia, are as good examples of
the application of Mill's limiting principle as any other. Suicide, assisted suicide,
and active voluntary euthanasia, no less than the sale of oneself into slavery, are
acts that abdicate liberty in a way that foregoes any future use of liberty beyond the
single act involved. Suicide, assisted suicide, and active voluntary euthanasia are
the alienation of freedom. Thus, if Mill's "Harm Principle" cannot include the liberty
to sell oneself into slavery, so, too, it cannot include one's decision to engage in an
act of active euthanasia.
One might respond by claiming that it is the social nature of the agreement to
sell oneself into slavery that excludes this act from Mill's conception of liberty.
However, the reasons he provides to explain why slavery is inimical to liberty have
more to do with the concept of liberty-its scope and definition-than with the
nature of the act of agreeing to enslave oneself. See Marzen, supra note 9, at 807
(discussing the parallels between assisted suicide and slavery).
The constitutional prohibition on slavery embodied in the Thirteenth Amend-
ment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, serves as a poignant reminder that liberty is not
absolute. Cf. Andrew Koppelman, Legal Theory: Forced Labor: A Thirteenth Amend-
ment Defense of Abortion, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 480 (1990) (arguing that laws
regulating abortion may constitute a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment).
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to be within the scope of legislative discretion.9 ' The list of
92 939such conduct is familiar: prostitution, incest," drug use,"
self-mutilation,95 sale of one's body parts,96 and active volun-
tary euthanasia.9 The personal autonomy model's principle
would insulate all these activities from regulation were it
engrafted onto the Fourteenth Amendment. It might even
render laws requiring motor vehicle passengers to wear seat
belts or laws requiring motorcycle riders to wear safety hel-
mets beyond the reach of the state's police powers. 98 If the
Constitution embraced a theory of personal autonomy broad
enough to include the liberty of the terminally ill to end their
lives with a doctor's aid, it would be hard to see why it
would, or how it could, end there.99
91. Of course, the state interests in these cases may be different than those
involved in the case of assisted suicide. It is important, however, to keep distinct
the two aspects of the constitutional inquiry: (1) is there a liberty to engage in the
conduct; and (2) what is the scope of the individual liberty after balancing it against
the state's interests. Some sliding between the two aspects of the constitutional
inquiry is perhaps inevitable because the two aspects are conceptually related.
92. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 68 n.15 (1973); Lutz v.
United States, 434 A.2d 442 (D.C. App. 1981) (holding that there is no constitutional
right to engage in prostitution).
93. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 552 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (suggest-
ing that the right to privacy would not include a right to engage in incest).
94. The Supreme Court in Hardwick pointed out that "[v]ictimless crimes, such
as the possession and use of illegal drugs, do not escape the law where they are
committed at home." 478 U.S. 186, 195 (1986). See also Paris Adult Theatre I, 413
U.S. at 67-68 ("The fantasies of a drug addict are his own and beyond the reach of
government, but government regulation of drug sales is not prohibited by the
Constitution.").
95. Paris Adult Theatre 1, 413 U.S. at 68 n.15 (noting that "state statute books
are replete with constitutionally unchallenged laws against ... voluntary self-
mutilation.., although [this] crime may only directly involve 'consenting adults' ");
Grossman v. Baumgartner, 218 N.E.2d 259 (N.Y. 1966) (holding constitutional a
state law prohibiting tattooing of a human being by a person not licensed to prac-
tice medicine or osteopathy).
96. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 274e (1994) (making it "unlawful for any person to
knowingly acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer any human organ for valuable
consideration for use in transplantation if the transfer affects interstate commerce").
97. No United States case has ever held that there is a right to commit active
voluntary euthanasia. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., HORNBOOK ON
CRIMINAL LAW § 5.11(a) n.3 (1986). Consent by the victim to such an act has never
amounted to a recognized defense to a charge of murder in this country. Id.
§ 5.11(a).
98. Cf. Picou v. Gillum, 874 F.2d 1519, 1519-20 & n.1 (11th Cir. 1989) (opinion
by Powell, J., sitting by designation) (upholding state motorcycle helmet law and
noting that all earlier cases holding to the contrary had been either reversed or
overturned); People v. Kohrig, 498 N.E.2d 1158 (Ill. 1986), appeal dismissed, 479
U.S. 1073 (1987) (dismissing seat belt law challenge based on privacy grounds).
99. See Marc Spindelman, Roe vs. Wade Recognizes No 'Right' to Die, DET.
NEWS, Oct. 16, 1994, at 3B.
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Not only does the personal autonomy model prove too much,
but it also does not resonate with Supreme Court doctrine.
The Court's decisions in Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood
of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, as well as Carey v.
Population Services International,'00 Bowers v. Hardwick, and
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health-all cases
that involved the reach of constitutional precepts of personal
autonomy-stand squarely for the proposition that the Con-
stitution's recognition of personal liberty is not as broad as the
personal autonomy model would suggest.
Although the Court's abortion decisions contain elegant and
expansive language that assisted suicide proponents exploit
in their cause,' 0 ' a close reading of the Court's most impor-
tant abortion decisions-Roe and Casey-suggests that the
meaning and relevance of such language is limited.
10 2
Without question, Roe is the most far-reaching of the
Court's abortion decisions. Not even Roe, however, estab-
lished that one has a nearly unlimited right to personal
100. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
101. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
851 (1992) (citations omitted). The Court observed:
Our law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to mar-
riage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and
education. Our cases recognize "the right of the individual, married or single,
to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so funda-
mentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child."
Our precedents "have respected the private realm of family life which the state
cannot enter." These matters, involving the most intimate and personal
choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity
and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of exis-
tence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs
about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they
formed under compulsion of the State.
This language, repeated wholesale or in parts, has been invoked as a virtual mantra
by proponents of assisted suicide. See, e.g., Sedler, I Say No, supra note 4, at 728.
102. The Casey joint opinion suggested the limited nature of its holding when it
explained:
In any event, because Roe's scope is confined by the fact of its concern with
postconception potential life, a concern otherwise likely to be implicated only
by some forms of contraception protected independently under Griswold and
later cases, any error in Roe is unlikely to have serious ramifications in future
cases.
505 U.S. at 859.
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autonomy like the right the autonomy model proposes. In
finding that the right to privacy guaranteed a pregnant wom-
an's right to decide to have an abortion, the Supreme Court,
through Justice Blackmun, confronted and renounced the
claim that one has an unlimited right to do with one's body as
one pleases.' °3 Such a right, Blackmun explained, was broader
than any encompassed by the Due Process Clause. According
to Justice Blackmun:
The privacy right involved, therefore, cannot be said to be
absolute. In fact, it is not clear to us that the claim as-
serted by some amici that one has an unlimited right to
do with one's body as one pleases bears a close relation-
ship to the right of privacy previously articulated in the
Court's decisions. The Court has refused to recognize an
unlimited right of this kind in the past.' °4
By virtue of its ultimate holding, Roe offers the strongest
basis from which to argue that the terminally ill (or others)
enjoy a constitutional right to commit assisted suicide. In
reality, Roe offers very little to succor proponents of the right
to die.
The Supreme Court's opinion in Casey similarly provides
little meaningful authority for the proposition that the Due
Process Clause embraces anything akin to the personal au-
tonomy model's view. In the course of evaluating the state's
interests in restricting a woman's right to abortion, the joint
opinion in that case found:
The woman's liberty is not so unlimited, however, that
from the outset the State cannot show its concern for the
life of the unborn, and at a later point in fetal develop-
ment the State's interest in life has sufficient force so
that the right of the woman to terminate the pregnancy
can be restricted. 10 5
If individuals had a generous right to personal autonomy, one
suspects that a state's "concern for the life of the unborn"
could not-even in the earliest stages of pregnancy-properly
103. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
104. Id. at 154 (citations omitted).
105. Casey, 505 U.S. at 869.
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present any limitation on a woman's right to have an
abortion. 6
This is not all that the joint opinion had to say about the
nature of a woman's liberty to end a pregnancy, however. In
all fairness, the proponents of assisted suicide have un-
earthed some very broad language from the Casey joint opin-
ion that is quite favorable to their position. Consider, for
example, the following passages from Casey that are often
quoted in support of the right to assisted suicide:
It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of
personal liberty which the government may not enter....
... It is settled now that the Constitution places limits
on a State's right to interfere with a person's most basic
decisions about family and parenthood ... as well as
bodily integrity....
• .. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's
own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and
of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters
could not define the attributes of personhood were they
formed under compulsion of the State.'0 7
This language is expansive. Standing alone, such language
might well be read for the proposition that an individual has
a right to make self-defining decisions about life and death.
When read in light of everything else the Casey Court had to
say, however, it becomes difficult to argue that this language
supports a right to assisted suicide. In fact, when taken in
context, this language does little to help the case of assisted
suicide proponents at all.' 0 8
106. Perhaps limitations during later stages of pregnancy on the exercise of the
abortion right might succumb as well to a broad right to personal autonomy, i.e.,
the right to personal autonomy might overbear the state's interests in regulation
contra.
107. Casey, 505 U.S. at 847-51.
108. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 590-91 (9th Cir.
1996). The Ninth Circuit observed:
The language taken from Casey ... should not be removed from the context in
which it was uttered. Any reader of judicial opinions knows they often attempt
a generality of expression and a sententiousness of phrase that extend far
beyond the problem addressed. It is commonly accounted an error to lift
sentences or even paragraphs out of one context and [to] insert the abstracted
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The Casey Court expressly limited the impact of its holding
in future cases, commenting that
because Roe's scope is confined by the fact of its concern
with postconception potential life, a concern otherwise
likely to be implicated only by some forms of contracep-
tion protected independently under [other Supreme Court
rulings], any error in Roe is unlikely to have serious ram-
ifications in future cases.' °9
If the Justices who wrote the joint opinion in Casey are to be
taken literally, as assisted suicide advocates insist, it is hard
to read their opinion as endorsing the model of personal au-
tonomy.
Although, in the last analysis, Casey upheld the abortion
right, assisted suicide proponents demonstrate their misun-
derstanding of Casey when they read that case as if it involved
only-or nearly only-the issue of women's reproductive
liberty (central though that question was in the case). For
better or worse, the three Justices who controlled the outcome
of Casey reaffirmed a woman's right to abortion for reasons
having to do with the role of the Supreme Court in our federal
scheme, as much as for reasons having to do with women's
liberty. As the Court observed:
thought into a wholly different context. To take three sentences out of an
opinion over thirty pages in length dealing with the highly charged subject of
abortion and to find these sentences "almost prescriptive" in ruling on a
statute proscribing the promotion of suicide is to make an enormous leap, to
do violence to the context, and to ignore the differences between the regulation
of reproduction and the prevention of the promotion of killing a patient at his
or her request.
The inappropriateness of the language of Casey in the situation of assisted
suicide is confirmed by considering what this language, as applied by the
district court, implies. The decision to choose death, according to the district
court's use of Casey's terms, involves "personal dignity and autonomy" and "the
right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and
of the mystery of human life." The district court attempted to tie these concepts
to the decision of a person terminally ill. But there is no way of doing so ... If
such liberty exists in this context, as Casey asserted in the context of reproduc-
tive rights, every man and woman in the United States must enjoy it ... The
conclusion is a reductio ad absurdum.
Id. (citations omitted).
109. Casey, 505 U.S. at 859. Cf. Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv., 492 U.S.
490, 523 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("It may be correct that the use of
postfertilization contraceptive devices is constitutionally protected by Griswold and
its progeny.").
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A decision to overrule Roe's essential holding under the
existing circumstances would address error, if error there
was, at the cost of both profound and unnecessary damage
to the Court's legitimacy, and to the Nation's commitment
to the rule of law. It is therefore imperative to adhere to the
essence of Roe's original decision, and we do so today.1
These are not the words of Supreme Court Justices who
decided to uphold Roe and were eager to support a notion of
personal autonomy that even the Roe Court thought untena-
ble. Despite assisted suicide proponents' urgings to the con-
trary, the Supreme Court that decided Casey likely will not
find the principle contained in the autonomy model supported
by its abortion jurisprudence.
Along with the Supreme Court's abortion jurisprudence,
recent substantive due process doctrine has signaled that the
Court stands prepared to interpret the right to personal
autonomy quite narrowly, and certainly no more broadly than
necessary to support those decisions already protected by the
Due Process Clause. In Carey v. Population Services Interna-
tional,"' where the Court struck down a state law regulating
the distribution and sale of contraceptive devices, the Court
demonstrated that its prior abortion decisions did not suggest
that an individual had an unqualified right to do with her
body as she pleased, even where matters of adult sexuality
were concerned." 2 The Carey Court explained:
Contrary to the suggestion advanced in Mr. Justice
Powell's opinion, we do not hold that state regulation must
meet this [strict scrutiny] standard "whenever it implicates
sexual freedom," or "affect[s] adult sexual relations," but
only when it "burden[s] an individual's right to decide to
prevent conception or terminate pregnancy by substantial-
ly limiting access to the means of effectuating that deci-
sion." As we observe below, "the Court has not definitively
answered the difficult question whether and to what
extent the Constitution prohibits state statutes regulating
[private consensual sexual] behavior among adults."...
110. Casey, 505 U.S. at 869.
111. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
112. See id. at 688.
113. Id. at 688 n.5 (citations omitted).
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The "difficult question" left unanswered by the Court in
Carey was answered in part in Bowers v. Hardwick."4 In
Hardwick, the Court made clear that it would not
constitutionalize a broad conception of personal autonomy
even where private, adult, consensual sexual conduct was
concerned." 5 Relying on the above-quoted passage from
Carey, and going one step beyond it, the Hardwick Court
dismissed the contention that the Constitution affords
protection to any kind of private sexual conduct between
consenting adults."' 6
Hardwick distinguished the right of two adult men to en-
gage in consensual sexual activity from the right involved in
Roe and other privacy cases. 1 7 As the Court observed, none of
the decisions protected by the right to privacy
bears any resemblance to the claimed constitutional right
of homosexuals to engage in acts of sodomy that is assert-
ed in this case. No connection between family, marriage,
or procreation on the one hand and homosexual activity
on the other has been demonstrated, either by the Court
of Appeals or by respondent."'
Moreover, the Court explained, the right of two adult men to
engage in consensual sodomy was neither implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty,' 9 nor deeply rooted in the nation's
history and tradition. 2 ° Any claim to the contrary, the Court
jabbed, was "at best, facetious."' Thus, Hardwick, in princi-
ple, eschewed any holding that all consensual sexual activity
114. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
115. Id. at 190-91 (rejecting contentions that previous cases had construed the
Constitution to confer a right of privacy that extends to homosexual sodomy).
116. Id. For criticism of Hardwick, see Kamisar, supra note 9, at 763 (quoting
CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW 82 (1991)); Kendall Thomas, Beyond the Privacy
Principle, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1431 (1992).
117. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 190-91.
118. Id. Evidently, no claim was made before the Supreme Court on Michael
Hardwick's behalf that the decision of two men to engage in the act of sodomy with
each other was a decision about whether to bear or beget a child, and that, there-
fore, the decision came within the scope of the right to privacy. Carey v. Population
Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 688-89 (1977) (describing the last of the right to privacy
cases as involving the decision whether to bear or beget a child). Such a claim, at
the least, is not plausible.
119. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 191.
120. Id. at 192.
121. Id. at 194.
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between adults was protected by the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
122
The Hardwick Court went on to note that institutional
reasons also justified the rejection of the constitutional right
asserted in that case. The Court determined that too great an
expansion of non-textually-based constitutional law threat-
ened to undermine the Court's institutional legitimacy.
123
Therefore, the Court explained, it would take care to avoid
expanding the substantive reach of the Due Process
Clause.24
The Court continued that, because the right at issue in
Hardwick did not fit into any of the categories of decisions
protected by the right to privacy, to recognize a right to
consensual same-sex sodomy would have required a
redefinition of the category of rights protected by the Due
Process Clause. Whereas before the Court had reconciled
Griswold, Eisenstadt v. Baird, and Roe and its progeny as
decisions all regarding matters of personal choice in marriage,
family, and procreation,'125 to uphold the right claimed in
Hardwick (or so the Court maintained) 126  would have
122. It remains an open question whether the right to engage in consensual
homosexual sodomy could be a constitutionally protected "liberty interest," despite
the fact that Hardwick found that the right to do so was not fundamental. To the
extent that the Court has breathed life into a new category of liberty interests since
it decided Hardwick, Hardwick cannot, as a formal matter, absolutely foreclose the
possibility that individuals have a liberty interest to engage in consensual homosex-
ual sodomy. Still, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court (at least as presently
constituted) would hold that individuals have such a right. The Supreme Court's
decision in Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996), does not indicate to the con-
trary.
123. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 194.
124. Through Justice White, the Court explained:
The Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals
with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the
language or design of the Constitution .... There should be, therefore, great
resistance to expand the substantive reach of [the Due Process Clauses of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments], particularly if it requires redefining the
category of rights deemed to be fundamental. Otherwise, the Judiciary neces-
sarily takes to itself further authority to govern the country without express
constitutional authority. The claimed right pressed on us today falls far short
of overcoming this resistance.
Id. at 194-95. This concern had troubled Justice White for quite some time. See
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 544 (1977) (White, J., dissenting)
(expressing similar concerns).
125. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 190-91.
126. See supra note 118.
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required it to reconcile these cases as protecting a right to
engage in any kind of sexual relations. 2 7 Without devoting
any attention to the issue of when the resistance to such a
redefinition of rights might be overcome, but pointing to one
reason it would not be, namely that the activity took place in
the privacy of a home, 28 the Court stated that the claim in
Hardwick fell short of doing so. 29
The personal autonomy model (and for that matter the right
to physician-assisted suicide) does not any more closely resem-
ble the category of rights the Hardwick Court deemed pro-
tected by the Due Process Clause than the right at issue in
Hardwick did. No amount of good lawyering or judicial fiat
could convincingly transform the right to assisted suicide into
a question of marriage, procreation, family relationships, child
rearing, or education. As a result, in order to establish that
the right to assisted suicide is protected as a Fourteenth
Amendment liberty interest would require redefining the
category of constitutionally protected liberty.
Professor Yale Kamisar has taken the position that the right
to consensual homosexual sexual activity lies closer to the heart
of Roe than do any of the principles, such as the personal auton-
omy model, advanced in support of a right to physician-assisted
suicide. 30 As Professor Kamisar's position implies, it is a shorter
move from (a) affording constitutional protection to decisions
relating to marriage, family, procreation, and the like, to (b)
affording constitutional protection to any decision involving
sexual activity, including homosexual sodomy, than it is from
(a) to (c) affording constitutional protections to any body- and
destiny-controlling decision an individual might make.
Hardwick's refusal to make the move from (a) to (b) ought to be
reason enough for courts not to make the bigger leap from (a)
to (c).' 31 All the same, there is more.
127. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 195-96.
128. Id. at 195.
129. Id. at 195.
130. Kamisar, supra note 9, at 767; Kamisar, supra note 3, at 228 ("A sphere of
conduct like that at issue in Hardwick seems much closer to marriage, procreation,
the use of contraceptives and abortion than the right to assisted suicide.").
131. The same institutional concerns that led the Court to reject the claimed
right in Hardwick also should lead courts to reject the claim that the federal
Constitution protects a right to assisted suicide. At least as much as the right at
issue in Hardwick, the personal autonomy model has, at best, "little or no cogniza-
ble roots in the language or design of the Constitution." Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 194.
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In the age of Roe, if Hardwick held that the Constitution
did not protect any type of sexual activity or consensual
sodomy, there cannot be much to the claim that, in the age of
Casey (a narrower opinion than Roe), the Constitution pro-
tects an individual's right to make body- and destiny-control-
ling decisions, including the right to assisted suicide. That
assertion is particularly true when one takes into account
that the right to make body- and destiny-controlling decisions
constitutes a more general right than the right to engage in
any type of sexual activity.
Additionally, to announce a hitherto unknown constitutional
right to personal autonomy ample enough to include a right to
assisted suicide would fly in the face of Hardwick's holding, as
well as its admonition against expanding the categories of
non-textually-based liberties. However appealing one might
consider such a result because of Hardwick's flaws, Hardwick
remains the law. Indeed, the dissenting Justices in Casey, who
called for Roe to be overturned, relied on Hardwick to support
their positions on the abortion question.
132
Nevertheless, if the Constitution protected the principle of
liberty embodied in the autonomy model, there would be no
basis for concluding that the right Hardwick rejected did not
similarly merit protection. 3 3 The principles that proponents
of assisted suicide have advanced in support of that right all
support a right to consensual homosexual sodomy, as well.
Thus, for the time being, Hardwick precludes recognizing a
right to assisted suicide.
Lastly, Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health,34
the Supreme Court's sole right-to-forego-treatment case, further
confirms that the Court's substantive due process doctrine
forecloses the model's notion of constitutionally protected
personal autonomy. 135 It is important to note a fact that often
Thus, if the concerns articulated in Hardwick about redefining the class of protected
rights amounts to a principle of constitutional adjudication to which courts should
adhere, courts should turn back present and future challenges to state laws ban-
ning assisted suicide.
132. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 953
(1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
133. As Professor Kamisar has pointed out, proponents of assisted suicide quite
often make their constitutional arguments as if Hardwick were not on the books.
See Kamisar, supra note 3, at 228.
134. 497 U.S. 261 (1989).
135. A number of state court decisions cited by the Court make plain that those
courts did not mean to establish or even to suggest a right to active euthanasia,
including a right to suicide, when deciding to recognize a right to passive euthanasia.
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receives inadequate attention when assisted suicide advocates
use Cruzan to support their argument: the Cruzan Court upheld
the state's restriction on the right to withdraw lifesaving
medical treatment.13 Of course, this holding turned on the
state's interests implicated by the refusal-of-treatment decision
involved in that case. Nevertheless, the point is relevant for
reasons that shall become apparent momentarily.
Although Cruzan assumed that the Fourteenth Amendment
protected a liberty interest in refusing unwanted but life-
saving medical treatment, 137 it would be a mistake to con-
clude that Cruzan comports with the personal autonomy
model. First, the result in the case implies that the right to
refuse unwanted medical treatment is not without limits, or
is not in any way as broad as the constitutional model of per-
sonal autonomy presented by assisted suicide advocates. '
Otherwise, the Court would likely have struck down the
state's evidentiary requirement as an impermissible con-
straint on Nancy Cruzan's liberty.
Second, proponents of assisted suicide cannot claim Cruzan
as authority for their position without considering the rea-
sons that led the Court to assume a Fourteenth Amendment
liberty interest in refusing lifesaving medical treatment. The
Cruzan Court found that the right to informed consent, the
See In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 670 (N.J. 1976), cert. denied, Ganger v. New Jersey,
429 U.S. 922 (1976). See also Marzen, supra note 9, at 806 & n.24. State courts may
continue to recognize the state interest in preventing suicide in order to block any at-
tempts to extend the principle on which the right to passive euthanasia is based to
the case of assisted suicide. Cf. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
1366-67 (2d ed. 1988). Although courts attempt to do this by recognizing the state
interest in preventing suicide, see, e.g., Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 663, this method is but
another way of suggesting that neither the common law nor the federal Constitution
protects a right or liberty to commit suicide or assisted suicide.
136. 497 U.S. at 284. The Cruzan majority believed that the right was Nancy
Cruzan's. Id. at 280. Cf infra note 164.
137. Commentators generally regard Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Cruzan as
going a step beyond the majority opinion to endorse the view that competent adults do
have a liberty interest in terminating or refusing lifesaving medical treatment. See,
e.g., Louis Michael Seidman, Confusion at the Border: Cruzan, "The Right to Die" and
the Public/Private Distinction, 1991 SUP. CT. REV. 47, 51 n.12. If so, one might well
maintain that a majority of the Court in Cruzan (Justice O'Connor plus the four
dissenters) recognized such a right.
138. The scope of the liberty interest involved in Cruzan is anything but clear.
For example, the Cruzan court left open the question of whether and when a state
could prevent a competent individual from terminating or refusing lifesaving medi-
cal treatment by virtue of its interests contra.
SPRING 1996]
812 University of Michigan Journal of Law Refonn [VOL. 29:3
"logical corollary" of the right to refuse unwanted medical
treatment, had long been recognized at common law. 3 9 The
majority opinion began its analysis with the common law
notion of bodily integrity, observing:
At common law, even the touching of one person by an-
other without consent and without legal justification was a
battery. Before the turn of the century this Court observed
that "[nio right is held more sacred, or is more carefully
guarded, by the common law, than the right of every
individual to the possession and control of his own person,
free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by
clean and unquestionable authority of law." This notion of
bodily integrity has been embodied in the requirement that
informed consent is generally required for medical treat-
ment. Justice Cardozo, while on the Court of Appeals of
New York, aptly described this doctrine: "Every human
being of adult years and sound mind has a right to
determine what shall be done with his own body; and a
surgeon who performs an operation without his patient's
consent commits an assault, for which he is liable in dam-
ages." The informed consent doctrine has become firmly
entrenched in American tort law.14
The Court then noted how entrenched the right to refuse
treatment had become since In re Quinlan,' the first major
case regarding refusal of treatment. After reviewing a number
of lower court decisions building on Quinlan,42 the Court
observed that these cases "demonstrate [that] the common law
doctrine of informed consent is viewed as generally encompass-
ing the right of a competent individual to refuse medical
treatment."
143
While the Cruzan opinion relied on those lower court deci-
sions to find the right to refuse treatment, it failed to men-
tion that many of the same lower courts whose decisions it
cited had not held that every decision to end one's life was
encompassed by the doctrine of informed consent. 44 Many of
139. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 270.
140. Id. at 269 (citations omitted).
141. Id. at 270-71 (citing In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976)).
142. See id. at 271-77.
143. Id. at 277.
144. Id. at 271-77. See also supra note 135.
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these lower court decisions, starting with In re Quinlan,'45
took great care to state that they were not recognizing a right
to commit suicide.
146
Despite the very broad language of Justice Cardozo's
decision in Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital,47
quoted by the Cruzan opinion, the right to bodily integrity
has never been taken to the limits of its logic. 48 Indeed,
although Cruzan could support the contention that a com-
petent individual has a liberty interest in making some
decisions about medical treatment, nowhere in that case did
the Court suggest that an individual has a right to refuse any
form of medical treatment. 149 More significantly, Cruzan did
not hold that a competent individual has a common law or
constitutional right to obtain any form of medical treatment
she wishes. Therefore, in light of the limitations lower courts
have placed on the right to informed consent, there is no
basis for the position that anyone, including the terminally
ill, has a common law right,'5 ° much less a Fourteenth
145. 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1967).
146. See TRIBE, supra note 135, at 1365 n.14.
147. 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) ("Every human being of adult years and sound
mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body. ."), over-
ruled by Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3 (N.Y. 1957).
148. See supra text accompanying notes 89-94. Moreover, in quoting
Schloendorff, 105 N.E. at 93, for the proposition that Justice (then Judge) Cardozo
would have supported a conception of bodily integrity vast enough to include a right
to assisted suicide, one must also explain away the fact that Cardozo joined the
majority in Schloendorff.
149. Even a very generous reading of Cruzan does not necessarily lend support
to the claim that there is a constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide. The
Cruzan majority understood the right involved in that case as the right of a compe-
tent individual's decision to reject unwanted but lifesaving medical treatment. If
Cruzan provides authority for the proposition that the Constitution guarantees a
right to physician-assisted suicide, then it must be because physician-assisted
suicide involves some kind of "medical treatment." Aside from the fact that the
medical establishment does not regard physician-assisted suicide in this way, see
infra text accompanying notes 223-24, it is difficult to see why providing a prescrip-
tion of lethal medication is any more a form of "medical treatment" than a physi-
cian's decision to help a patient commit suicide by use of carbon monoxide. It is
exceedingly unpersuasive that a physician's mere involvement in providing a lethal
prescription or in helping a patient to self-administer a lethal dose is enough,
without more, to convert physician-assisted suicide into a form of medical treat-
ment. The fact that one situation involves medical formalities seems irrelevant.
150. Although common law may have provided a right to informed consent, there
certainly was no common law right to suicide. See Thomas J. Marzen et al., Suicide:
A Constitutional Right?, 24 DUQ. L. REV. 1, 63, 69, 85-86, 88-89 (1985). Nor was
there any common law right to assisted suicide. See State v. Roberts, 178 N.W. 690
(Mich. 1920), overruled by State v. Kevorkian, 527 N.W.2d 714, 738-39 (Mich. 1994)
(overruling Roberts to the extent that it supports the view that the common law
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Amendment liberty interest, to receive medical assistance
from a doctor to commit suicide. Any claim to the contrary
would constitute a vast departure from the Supreme Court's
past jurisprudence that has never held that a competent indi-
vidual has an affirmative constitutional right to obtain medi-
cal treatment. 151
Cruzan provides still another reason to think that there is
no broad right to personal autonomy that would include a
right to commit assisted suicide. In the course of reaching its
decision, the Court relied on state laws against homicide and
assisted suicide as evidence of the states' commitment to
human life. 52 As Professor Kamisar has remarked, "If a
majority of the Supreme Court meant to suggest that laws
against assisted suicide are constitutionally suspect, it chose
a strange way of doing so. ", 153 If a majority of the Supreme
Court in Cruzan did not mean to suggest that one has a
definition of murder encompasses the act of intentionally providing the means by
which a person commits suicide and holding that there is a separate common law
offense of assisted suicide).
151. Arguably, if one has a right to refuse or terminate unwanted medical treat-
ment, one must also have a right to receive medical treatment. Supreme Court
doctrine, however, scarcely supports such a position. Perhaps the strongest authori-
ty for such a proposition can be found in the Court's abortion jurisprudence. The
author of Roe, Justice Blackmun, in his separate opinion in Casey, seemed to
interpret the right to abortion as a right to obtain medical treatment. As he
observed: "Just as the Due Process Clause protects the deeply personal decision of
the individual to refuse medical treatment, it also must protect the deeply personal
decision to obtain medical treatment, including a woman's decision to terminate a
pregnancy." Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 927
n.3 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part,
and dissenting in part). Even if this assertion were correct, the question of whether
an individual's decision to commit physician-assisted suicide involves a right to
obtain medical treatment would remain.
For the sake of argument, let us assume that the Constitution does include a
right to obtain medical treatment. Let us further assume that such a right includes
an individual's decision to obtain a doctor's assistance in committing suicide. Would
not such a right conflict directly with the Court's abortion funding decisions? See,
e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (holding that denial of public funding for
some medically necessary abortions does not unconstitutionally infringe on a wom-
an's abortion rights); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1976) (holding that states are not
required to provide Medicaid benefits to women seeking non-therapeutic abortions).
How far would such a right go? Would the Constitution compel the states or the
federal government to provide patients who wished to commit assisted suicide with
a physician to help them do it? Would FDA regulation of medications that could be
used to commit physician-assisted suicide pose an unconstitutional abridgement of
such a right? See Benton v. Kessler, 505 U.S. 1084 (1992); Debora C. Fliegelman,
Comment, The FDA and RU486: Are Politics Compatible with the FDA's Mandate of
Protecting Public Health and Safety?, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 143 (1993).
152. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 280 (1989).
153. Kamisar, supra note 9, at 34.
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protected liberty interest in committing suicide, it stands to
reason that the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause
cannot include the sort of liberty the personal autonomy mod-
el suggests.
154
Time and again, the Supreme Court has indicated that,
although the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause
includes a substantive component that imposes limits on the
legislative power of the states, the instances in which that
substantive component comes into play are few and far be-
tween. The personal autonomy model suggested by assisted
suicide advocates, which posits that the liberty of the Due
Process Clause prohibits states from interfering with the
body- and destiny-controlling decisions an individual may
make, represents a marked shift away from the Court's
cautious exposition of rights protected by the Constitution's
promise of liberty. As the few cases touched upon demonstrate,
the Court has eschewed the sort of approach to individual
liberty embodied in the personal autonomy model. These few
cases imply that based on current Supreme Court doctrine,
courts must reject the personal autonomy model and the right
to assisted suicide that it includes.
III. DISTINCTIONs BETWEEN ABORTION AND
PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE
The preceding argument notwithstanding, the Supreme
Court could still recognize a right to physician-assisted sui-
cide based on the reasoning of its abortion cases. To do so,
however, the Court either would have to ignore or downplay
the important distinctions between assisted suicide and abor-
tion.
This Part analyzes some of the distinctions. First, Part
III.A notes that the Court's recognition of the right to abor-
tion in Roe v. Wade was predicated upon the finding that the
abortion procedure did not end the life of a constitutional
"person." In contrast, there is no question that the practice of
assisted suicide involves the termination of the life of a
154. Even Justice Brennan, who considered a competent individual's right to
refuse lifesaving medical treatment fundamental, Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 304 (Brennan,
J., dissenting), did not consider that right "absolute." Id. at 312.
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constitutional person. Next, Part III.B argues that the emer-
ging understanding of the right to abortion as a sex equality
right further distinguishes abortion from assisted suicide.
And last, Part III.C distinguishes abortion from assisted
suicide in terms of the social meanings of the two practices.
This Part concludes by arguing that the differences between
abortion and assisted suicide warrant maintaining the
constitutional status quo protecting the right to abortion but
not assisted suicide.
A. The Personhood Distinction
The first and perhaps most obvious distinction between
abortion and assisted suicide is that the former does not
entail ending the life of a person protected by the Con-
stitution but the latter does. Central to the Court's recogni-
tion of a constitutional right to abortion was the Court's
finding in Roe that a fetus is not a constitutionally recognized
person whose rights, and among them, its "right to life," the
Fourteenth Amendment protects. The Court noted that, if the
fetus were a constitutional person, the argument for a right
to abortion would, "of course, collapse[], for the fetus' right to
life would be guaranteed specifically by the [Fourteenth]
Amendment." 5'
Had the Court found that the word "person" in the Four-
teenth Amendment included the unborn, it might have up-
held the state's prohibition on abortions. The theory of such a
ruling probably would have been that it does not offend the
Constitution for a state to protect the life of a person by
prohibiting such a life from being ended.' The Court toyed
155. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 156-57 (1973).
156. Justice Stewart during the second oral argument in Roe elucidated the
argument:
THE COURT: Well, if you're right that an unborn fetus is a person, then you
can't leave it to the legislature to play fast and loose dealing with that person.
In other words, if you're correct, in your basic submission that an unborn fetus
is a person, then abortion laws such as that which New York has are grossly
unconstitutional, isn't it?
MR. FLOWERS: That's right, yes.
THE COURT: Allowing the killing of people.
MR. FLOWERS: Yes, sir.
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with the rudiments of such a theory, questioning whether a
law permitting abortion would be unconstitutional were the
fetus a person for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Ultimately, though, the Court avoided these trouble-
some questions by squarely holding that "the word 'person,'
as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the
unborn."'57
Roe's reverberations do not justify the right to commit
assisted suicide.'58 Roe's holding that the word person has
"application only postnatally,"159 provides powerful evidence
that all postnatal persons are persons for constitutional pur-
poses. And the text of the Fourteenth Amendment, which
provides that, "All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of
the United States and of the State wherein they reside," 6 °
buttresses the point. Although Roe did not involve the termi-
nation of the life of a person as defined by the Constitution,
the act of physician-assisted suicide surely does.
Even the Cruzan Court did not suggest that Nancy Cruzan
was not a person protected by the Constitution, even though
she lived in a persistive vegetative state.'16 Can one reason-
ably suppose that the Court would entertain the idea that a
terminally ill individual was not a person entitled to constitu-
tional rights and constitutional protections when it was not
prepared to do so in the case of Nancy Cruzan?'62 Unlike a
75 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 827 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975).
157. Roe, 410 U.S. at 158.
158. See Marzen, supra note 9, at 805 (arguing that a right to assisted suicide is
not analogous to a right to abortion because fetuses, as unborn, have no liberties).
159. Roe, 410 U.S. at 157.
160. US. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See also Roe, 410 U.S. at 156-59 (discussing
the meaning of the word "person" in the Constitution).
161. The Court adopted the following definition of a vegetative state:
Vegetative state describes a body which is functioning entirely in terms of its
internal controls. It maintains temperature. It maintains heart beat and
pulmonary ventilation. It maintains digestive activity. It maintains reflex
activity of muscles and nerves for low level conditioned responses. But there is
no behavioral evidence of either self-awareness or awareness of the surround-
ings in a learned manner.
Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 266 n.1 (quoting In re Jobes,
529 A.2d 434, 438 (N.J. 1987)).
162. But see Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 354 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (suggesting that
the Court's opinion derives "from the premise that chronically incompetent persons
have no constitutionally cognizable interests at all, and so are not persons within
the meaning of the Constitution").
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patient in Cruzan's condition, the terminally ill are capable
of deciding to commit physician-assisted suicide; they are
also capable, at least in theory, of performing the last death-
causing act themselves.6 3 Because the terminally ill possess
what Professor Louis Michael Seidman has called the essen-
tial attributes of personhood-the capacity for "independent
thought, desire, and action"164-they must be persons just
like those who are not terminally ill.
This question is not meant to suggest that there is or should be a hierarchy of
persons such that some persons get constitutional rights and protections while
others receive none at all. Under the Equal Protection Clause, the lives of all
persons are of basic, equal value concerning matters of death, if not life. Thus, for
example, if the terminally ill have a right to commit assisted suicide, the non-
terminally ill must have a colorable equal protection argument that they, too, have
a right to die. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir.
1996) ("If such a liberty exists in this context . . . every man and woman in the
United States must enjoy it.").
163. See Kamisar, supra note 3, at 233.
164. See Seidman, supra note 137, at 63. For a radically different view of what
makes a person a "person," see John Harris, Euthanasia and the Value of Life, in
EUTHANASIA EXAMINED: ETHICAL, CLINICAL, AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 6 (John Keown ed.,
1995). Harris believes that "a person is a creature capable of valuing its own
existence." Id. at 9. On this view, Nancy Cruzan would not have been a person.
Harris admits as much, though he does not mention Cruzan by name. Id. at 19. A
less obvious example of a person who might not constitute a person under Harris'
definition would be a patient who, wracked with pain, has lost the capacity of val-
uing her existence. Harris nowhere suggests that the reasons a person cannot value
her existence limit his definition of personhood.
Even more shocking are Harris' views about what may be done to those who are
no longer persons. Regarding a hypothetical individual in a persistive vegetative
state, whom Harris calls "John," Harris explains:
Respect for persons requires that it is persons who will be respected and hence
their interests, whether those interests are experiential or critical. Where,
however, the person no longer exists, the critical interests of the former
person, while still worthy of our respect, must of necessity give way to the
significant interests or preferences of actual people. Thus John's critical
interest in a further thirty years of life in PVS [persistive vegetative state]
would give way to the significant critical interests or preferences of any actual
persons, persons to whom the satisfaction, or not, of their desires can continue
to matter. And this would surely accord with our intuitions here. We would
not, I imagine, think that someone who could no longer benefit from, or appre-
ciate, the life he was leading should have that life sustained when to do so
would cost the lives of others who could appreciate, and benefit from, their
existences.
Id. at 19. It would seem consistent with Harris' view to harvest a kidney or to take
scrapings of bone marrow to provide grafts for someone with leukemia without
consent from an individual in a persistive vegetative state. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at
313 n.13 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Few, if any, of those who support the practice of
euthanasia would want to argue that our constitutional scheme would permit the
sort of practices that would seem to accord with Harris' intuitions. See id. (explain-
ing that permitting procedures such as those just mentioned, among others, "would
be too brave a new world for . . . our Constitution").
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Professor Robert Sedler, to the contrary, has intimated that
the terminally ill may not be constitutionally protected per-
sons.'65 Part of Sedler's views are conventional enough: the
state's interest in preserving and protecting human life
cannot outweigh the decision of a terminally ill individual to
commit assisted suicide.' But taking the next step, Sedler
unconventionally opines that the reason that a state's inter-
est in preserving and protecting human life does not prevail
under such circumstances is that such a person has "no life
left to preserve."'67 Sedler writes:
The government typically tries to justify a ban on "assist-
ed suicide" on the ground that it has an interest in
"preserving life." But for the terminally ill there is no life
left to preserve .... The government can have no valid
interest whatsoever in prolonging dying, and in forcing
terminally ill people to go on suffering until they have
breathed their last agonizing breath.'68
Professor Yale Kamisar has responded to Sedler remarking:
"Surely, Sedler is not saying that one who is terminally ill is
no longer a 'person' or a 'human being'?"'69 This is, however,
not so clear from Sedler's writings. Sedler's argument relies
on two inconsistent positions. While he argues that the ter-
minally ill are not persons protected by the Constitution be-
cause they have "no life left to preserve," he maintains that
the terminally ill retain the constitutional right to commit
physician-assisted suicide. 70 Sedler does not explain how a
terminally ill individual can retain the essential attributes of
personhood and still have no life left to preserve.
There is a plausible explanation for the inconsistency of
Sedler's argument. Sedler confuses a claim often advanced in
support of the right of a patient in a persistive vegetative state
to authorize passive euthanasia (based on the "nonpersonhood"
of such a patient) with a claim customarily advanced in sup-
port of a right to assisted suicide (based on a notion of
personal autonomy). Passive euthanasia has sometimes been
165. See Sedler, I Say No, supra note 4, at 729-31.
166. Id. at 729-30.
167. Id. at 730.
168. Id.
169. Kamisar, supra note 3, at 235.
170. See, e.g., Sedler, I Say No, supra note 4, at 730.
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defended by the argument that "as sick patients at the end of
their lives become more fetus-like-as they lose their capacity
for independent thought, desire, and action-their rights...
diminish as well." 1 It may satisfy some to describe individu-
als like Nancy Cruzan as "fetus-like" because they have lost
their capacity for "independent thought, desire, and action,"
and to permit the lives of such individuals to be ended by
passive euthanasia. But the terminally ill are not fetus-like;
they may have a number of months or years left to live, and
their "mental powers can hardly be substantially impaired" if
they would freely and "rationally" choose death by assisted
suicide.
172
The failure to distinguish between the reasons that some
might think that fetus-like individuals have a right to commit
passive euthanasia and one of the reasons some believe that
the terminally ill have a right to commit physician-assisted
suicide forces those who make this mistake, including Sedler,
to take a position unprecedented in the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence: the terminally ill have a constitutional right to
end their lives with a physician's assistance because they are
not persons protected by the Constitution. Of course, this
position ignores the obvious point that if, like fetuses, the
terminally ill are not protected persons, they have no constitu-
tional rights at all.
The argument in support of a constitutional right to physi-
cian-assisted suicide must be no stronger than the argument
for a right to abortion because a terminally ill individual,
unlike a fetus, can decide for herself to end her life (meaning
she has a clearer claim to personhood). 173 Roe demonstrates
171. Seidman, supra note 137, at 63.
172. Kamisar, supra note 3, at 235.
173. The fact that an individual possesses the capacity to decide to end her life
does not mean that she has a constitutional right to do so. See, e.g., Yale Kamisar,
Are Laws Against Assisted Suicide Unconstitutional?, 23 HASTINGS CENTER REP.,
May-June 1993, at 33. Were the capacity to make a decision the touchstone of
constitutional rights, nearly anyone-not just the terminally ill-would have a
constitutional right to commit assisted suicide. See Compassion in Dying v. Washing-
ton, 49 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 1996). Perhaps this potential result explains why the
Supreme Court has never held that one's capacity to give consent to a certain
procedure establishes a right to such a procedure or that only those who have the
capacity to give such consent have a right to do so.
Recall that Cruzan involved an individual without the capacity to make any
decision, much less a decision to withdraw lifesaving medical treatment. The claim
in the case, therefore, was that Nancy Cruzan had a right to have others carry out
her previously expressed wish not to have her life sustained by artificial means. Laws
permitting advanced directives, or "living wills" as they are often called, have been
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that who exercises a right is not the only relevant consider-
ation in the constitutional analysis; who is affected by the
exercise of that right is important, as well. As discussed
earlier, Roe implies that when the individual affected by the
exercise of a right is a constitutionally protected person, no
right to end life exists. Because a terminally ill individual's
decision to commit physician-assisted suicide undeniably will
end the life of a constitutionally protected person, courts
should find that, unlike the right to abortion, the Constitution
does not protect such a decision." 4
B. The Sex Equality Distinction
A second important distinction between the rights to abor-
tion and assisted suicide is that abortion, unlike assisted
suicide, can be justified on sex equality grounds. As one major
textbook of American constitutional law has observed: "[T]here
seems to be a growing consensus that the best argument for
the right to abortion is based on principles of sex equality
rather than due process.' 1 5 A number of commentators have
argued that the Supreme Court's reliance on the right to
privacy, or more recently, on Fourteenth Amendment liberty
interests, to support the right to abortion inadequately reflects
the sex equality implications of the abortion right.'76 Of
adopted by many states. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-8A-2 (1990); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-1
(Supp. 1995); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 35/1 (West 1993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 144A.3
(West Supp. 1996); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-101 (1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-H:3
(Supp. 1995); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2960 (McKinney 1993). The theory of such laws
is that we ought to respect the forward-looking wishes of individuals out of respect
for an individual's autonomy. See DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 226. But as Professor
Dworkin concedes, there is a distinct possibility that by the time the death-causing
course of events begins, the patient may have changed her mind, but because of her
medical condition, may no longer have the ability to express her desire to continue
living. Id.
174. See John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf A Comment on Roe v. Wade,
82 YALE L.J. 920, 932 n.81 (1973) (comparing abortion to murder of an unwanted two-
year-old or a senile parent in a well-known article published just three months after
Roe was decided).
175. WILLIAM B. LoCKHART ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES-COMMENTS-- QUES-
TIONS 448 (7th ed. 1991).
176. See TRIBE, supra note 135, at 1353-59; Kristin Booth Glen, Abortion in the
Courts: A Laywoman's Historical Guide to the New Disaster Area, FEMINIST STUD.,
Feb. 1978, at 9 (arguing that Roe was really a physicians' rights case); Catharine A.
MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1308-24
(1991); Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion
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course, the more the right to abortion is grounded in notions
of sex equality, the weaker the comparison-and correspond-
ingly, the stronger the distinction-between abortion and phy-
sician-assisted suicide.
Some have criticized Roe v. Wade177 for basing the right to
abortion on a theory of privacy. Professor Catharine A.
MacKinnon explains: "The argument is that privacy doctrine
reaffirms and reinforces what the feminist critique of sexuality
criticizes: the public/private split."178 Although the Court no
longer grounds the right to abortion in privacy doctrine as it
did when Professor MacKinnon lanced Roe's theoretical under-
pinnings, the Court's redefinition of the abortion right as a
Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest has not rendered such
criticism obsolete.
The liberty currently undergirding the right to abortion is,
for purposes of stressing the sex equality distinction between
abortion and assisted suicide, conceptually indistinguishable
from the "right to privacy," which used to do the job.179 Liberty
shares privacy's underlying assumptions about individuals and
individuality, and about notions of autonomy, bodily integrity,
and self-determination.' 80 Some commentators have expressed
Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 350-80 (1992);
Cass R. Sunstein, Neutrality in Constitutional Law (With Special Reference to
Pornography, Abortion, and Surrogacy), 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 31-44 (1992).
177. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
178. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Privacy v. Equality: Beyond Roe v. Wade, in
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 93 (1987).
179. But see, e.g., Erin Daly, Reconsidering Abortion Law: Liberty, Equality, and
the New Rhetoric of Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 77, 118-26
(1996) (drawing a distinction between abortion as privacy and abortion as liberty).
180. The joint opinion in Casey illustrates this point in that it simply recolored
the Court's cases involving "marriage, procreation, contraception, family relation-
ships, child rearing, and education," as involving "the most intimate and personal
choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and
autonomy, [which] are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment." Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)
(citation omitted). See also id. at 856. Casey indicated no major retooling of the
assumptions about why certain liberties are constitutionally protected. Indeed, Casey
relied quite heavily on the theories of the Court's earlier privacy jurisprudence to
justify continued constitutional protection for a woman's right to abortion. See id. at
851 (relying on the Court's jurisprudence regarding reproduction and familial
relationships to conclude that the Fourteenth Amendment's promise of protected
liberty includes a right to abortion); id. at 857 (explaining that Roe can be regarded
"not only as an exemplar of Griswold liberty but as a rule (whether or not mistaken)
of personal autonomy and bodily integrity, with doctrinal affinity to cases recognizing
limits on governmental power to mandate medical treatment or to bar its rejection");
id. at 877 ("What is at stake is the woman's right to make the ultimate decision, not
a right to be insulated from all others in doing so.").
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concerns over the Court's unwillingness to conceive of the
right to abortion in terms of its implications for women or to
view the right to abortion as a sex equality right. These
concerns remain as valid today as a decade ago. Thus, while
the redefinition of the abortion right may have serious rami-
fications in constitutional or legal terms, it has little impact on
the due process theory that informs the abortion right.
The right to privacy articulated in Roe, like the concept of
individual liberty intimated in more recent cases, 181 imposes
limits on the state's authority to intrude into an individual's
private conduct or choice. Privacy and liberty theories assume
that individuals are autonomous decision makers who conduct
themselves freely and equally in the private realm.' 82 Com-
mentators argue that women's experience and social status
call this presupposition into question,8 3 and point to the
evidence of women's experience to establish the rather unre-
markable proposition that women are not as free as men to
conduct themselves in society and to make decisions.
18 4
Aside from permitting some women under some circum-
stances to decide to have an abortion, neither the privacy nor
liberty theories does anything to remedy women's social in-
equality. For example, neither theory specifically addresses
women's social inequality to enable women to exercise mean-
ingful control over their sexuality before they are faced with
the decision whether to have an abortion.
The privacy and liberty theories do not address women's
social inequality because they do not perceive inequality, or
worse, they assume that such inequality does not exist. Worse
still, even if either of these theories did -contemplate the
existence of inequality, they would be powerless to remedy
such inequality. Once something is within the sphere of pri-
vate choice or individual liberty, the state may not do any-
thing about it."8 5 What is not in the public sphere is, after all,
not a matter of public concern. In short, the privacy and
liberty approaches to the right to abortion are an inadequate
181. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990);
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
182. See MACKINNON, supra note 178, at 99.
183. See id. at 100-02.
184. See id.
185. Except, of course, where the state has an exceedingly strong reason (in
constitutional terms, a "compelling" reason) for doing so. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 155-56 (1973).
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theoretical foundation on which to base the abortion right.
Neither approach conceptualizes the abortion right in gender-
specific terms, and neither takes full account of women's social
inequality.'86
A number of Supreme Court Justices have demonstrated
their sensitivity to such criticism. In reaffirming what they
deemed the essential holding of Roe, the authors of the Casey
joint opinion observed that women play a unique role in
society, which encompasses the decision to terminate an un-
wanted pregnancy:
Though abortion is conduct, it does not follow that the
State is entitled to proscribe it in all instances. That is
because the liberty of the woman is at stake in a sense
unique to the human condition and so unique to the law.
The mother who carries a child to full term is subject to
anxieties, to physical constraints, to pain that only she
must bear.... Her suffering is too intimate and personal
for the State to insist, without more, upon its own vision
of the woman's role, however dominant that vision has
been in the course of our history and culture. The destiny
of the woman must be shaped to a large extent on her own
conception of her spiritual imperatives and her place in
society.187
186. See MACKINNON, supra note 178, at 97-100. In light of the foregoing argu-
ments, some commentators and judges (including members of the Supreme Court)
have suggested that the constitutional theory of sex equality, barely a generation old,
more accurately reflects the effect that laws restricting abortion have on the mainte-
nance of women's social inequality than does a Fourteenth Amendment liberty or
privacy view, and that, therefore, the theory of sex equality better supports the
constitutional protection afforded the abortion decision. See GUIDO CALABRESI, IDEALS,
BELIEFS, ATITrUDES, AND THE LAW 99-102 (1985); CASS R SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTI-
TUTION 272-85 (1993); TRIBE, supra note 135, at 1353-55; Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1199-1202 (1992); Kenneth L.
Karst, Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 57-59 (1977); MacKinnon, supra note 176, at 1319; Francis Olsen, Unraveling
Compromise, 103 HARV. L. REV. 105, 117-26 (1989); Giles R. Scofield, Rethinking Roe,
8 TRENDS IN HEALTH CARE, L. & ETHics, Summer 1993, at 17, 19-20; Siegal, supra note
176, at 350-80; David A. Strauss, Abortion, Toleration and Moral Uncertainty, 1992
SUP. CT. REV. 1, 18-22.
Unlike the law of privacy, the theory of sex equality assumes that women live
under prevailing conditions of legal and social inequality, or, at least, does not
assume that they do not. Therefore, to the extent that restrictive abortion laws pose
a substantial obstacle to women's social standing, such laws might not withstand
constitutional scrutiny under a sex equality analysis.
187. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992).
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Addressing why principles of stare decisis required affirming
Roe, the Court explained that a generation of American wom-
en have relied on being able to terminate an unwanted preg-
nancy and that the right to abortion has enhanced women's
equal participation in society. The Court observed that
for two decades of economic and social developments, peo-
ple have organized intimate relationships and made choic-
es that define their views of themselves and their places in
society, in reliance on the availability of abortion in the
event that contraception should fail. The ability of women
to participate equally in the economic and social life of the
Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their
reproductive lives.
8
By recognizing the relationship between women's economic
and social inequality and the abortion right, the Casey Court
seemed to signal that it considered gender concerns an illu-
minating, albeit not a controlling, factor, in the continued
constitutional protection afforded a woman's right to abortion.
Several Justices have gone further, indicating that they
would be willing to consider the right to abortion a sex equal-
ity right. Justice Ginsburg has most clearly demonstrated her
commitment to the idea." 9 Justice Blackmun, too, has dem-
onstrated that he was not only aware of, but also not opposed
to, the idea. 9 '
Even though the right to abortion may still be protected as
a due process, as opposed to a sex equality, right, there are
hints in current doctrine that individual Justices have noted
the conceptual inadequacies of the constitutional doctrine and
have begun to incorporate sex equality concerns into their
analysis of the abortion right. 9 ' In sharp contrast to the
abortion decision, a right to assisted suicide could not properly
be grounded in principles of sex equality. As Professor Seth
Kreimer has recently observed, "The class of individuals who
188. Id. at 856.
189. See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality
in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375 (1985); Ginsburg, supra note 186, at
1185.
190. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 927-28 & n.4 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part,
concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
191. See Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 323 (1993)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
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seek physician-assisted suicide is not defined by sex .... ,,192 To
date, there have been no sex equality claims to a right to
assisted suicide.
193
As the abortion decision comes more and more to be under-
stood as a sex equality right, the claimed analogy between
abortion and assisted suicide grows weaker.
C. Social Meaning of Physician-Assisted
Suicide and Abortion
A significant problem in any discussion of sensitive
medico-legal issues is the marked, perhaps unconscious,
tendency of many to distort what the law is in pursuit of
what they would like the law to be. Nowhere does this
tendency prove a larger barrier to the intelligent resolution
of legal questions than in the debate over patient rights at
the end of life.'94
This Article has examined the distinctions between abortion
and assisted suicide from the perspective of Supreme Court
doctrine, using that doctrine to explain that, although the Due
Process Clause protects (at least in the early stages) a wom-
an's right to an abortion, it does not necessarily protect an
individual's decision to enlist the aid of others to commit
suicide. This Article will now look at the relationship between
abortion and assisted suicide from a different perspective--one
based on broader social and legal distinctions.
A number of experts--doctors, ethicists, and lawyers-
contend that the right to assisted suicide should not be recog-
nized because of its social justice implications.'95 These
experts maintain that, in the case of terminally ill patients,
192. Kreimer, supra note 9, at 850.
193. Although some feminists appear sympathetic to the right to assisted suicide,
see, e.g., Leslie Bender, A Feminist Analysis of Physician-Assisted Dying and Volun-
tary Active Euthanasia, 59 TENN. L. REV. 519 (1992), whether the radical feminist
critique of power relations would be sympathetic to a right to physician-assisted
suicide remains uncertain.
194. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 663-64 (N.J. 1967) (discussing constitutional
and legal issues that, although asserted, did not apply to the Quinlan case).
195. See, e.g., John D. Arras, The Right to Die on the Slippery Slope, 8 Soc.
THEORY & PRAc. 285, 302-19 (1982) (arguing that a right to active voluntary
euthanasia would lead to great injustice, particularly for poor citizens).
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the economically, racially, ethnically, or physically disadvan-
taged could be forced to exercise an "assisted suicide option"
should one become available'96 because they will be unable to
afford adequate palliative care. The more "advantaged" would
have more "free will" to determine whether and when to
commit assisted suicide because they will be able to afford
adequate care, and thus, their "choice" to exercise an "assist-
ed suicide option" will be more meaningful than that of the
more disadvantaged members of society.
19 7
Compare this "social justice" argument against physician-
assisted suicide with the main line of attack on the death
penalty: Because the death penalty is more likely to be
sought and obtained in cases in which a minority defendant
has been charged in a capital case, the administration of the
death penalty may be racist and it should be banished until
such time as the inequality of retributive justice can be reme-
died.198
This "social justice" argument has some appeal, but it is
not without flaws. Cannot the same sort of argument be
made in the case of abortion?199 If poor or minority women
face the reality that they will not be able to afford to bear
and rear children and will, therefore, be more likely than
middle-class or non-minority women to avail themselves of
the "abortion option" rather than to suffer the unaffordable
or unbearable alternative, do the dictates of social justice
applied to their unborn children not suggest that the right to
abortion should be rejected altogether? This Article does not
resort to this sort of refrain as the basis for its position
196. In a related vein, Professor David Velleman has argued that creating an
assisted suicide option in our culture, obsessed as it is with youth, vigor, and
productivity, would be like
establishing a right to duel in a culture obsessed with personal honor.... By
eliminating the option of dueling (if we can), we can eliminate the reasons that
make it rational for people to duel in most cases. To restore the option of
dueling would be to give people reasons for dueling that they didn't previously
have. Similarly, I believe, to offer the option of dying may be to give people
new reasons for dying.
J. David Velleman, Against the Right to Die, 17 J. MED. & PHIL. 665, 676 (1992).
197. Id.
198. For the seminal argument against the death penalty, see CHARLES C. BLACK,
JR., CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE INEVITABILITY OF CAPRICE AND MISTAKE (2d ed. 1981).
199. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 825 & n.99 (9th Cir.
1996).
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against assisted suicide. Rather, it raises the point because it
provides some helpful insights into why we might favor the
status quo where there is a right to abortion but not a right
to assisted suicide.
The remainder of this section will look at the distinction
between abortion and assisted suicide from a broad perspec-
tive. The arguments that follow are not purely "legal" in the
doctrinal sense. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's modern
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence has taken account of
such arguments. 00 First, Part III.C.1 considers the differences
between abortion and assisted suicide from the decision mak-
er's perspective. Then Part III.C.2 addresses "society's"
perspective on the distinction between abortion and assisted
suicide. Finally, Part III.C.3 examines the medical establish-
ment's views on abortion and assisted suicide, and makes
some concluding observations.
1. The Decision Maker's Viewpoint-A woman's decision
whether to have an abortion is not made in the abstract. A
woman's decision whether to have an abortion is not merely
some philosopher's (or lawyer's) hypothetical Hobson's choice.
When a woman decides to terminate a pregnancy, the dilem-
ma, the act, and the consequences are real. Much the same
would undoubtedly hold true of an individual's decision to
commit assisted suicide, should such an option become avail-
able.
Although one could characterize the right to abortion as an
autonomous choice, rarely, if ever, would that characterization
be correct. Consider two cases in which a pregnant woman
makes the "choice" to have an abortion. First, take the case of
an affluent, married woman with a career. Suppose that this
woman stands unprepared to sacrifice her career, her mar-
riage, or her other interests, for the sake of the potential life
of her fetus and decides to have an abortion. One might argue
that she has made an autonomous choice, but has she really?
Would not the choice be more meaningful, and therefore more
autonomous, if she did not have to choose between a career
and motherhood? Is this woman's choice to have an abortion
in fact a choice to have an abortion, or is it a choice not to lose
a career or marriage, or both?
200. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967); Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
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Or take the case of a poor single woman who "chooses" to
have an abortion. (Let us assume that she does not have a ca-
reer and is simply down on her luck, so as to place her in a
position of sharper contrast to the first hypothetical woman.)
Why might this woman make such a "choice"? There are many
possible reasons. She might, for example, decide that, al-
though an abortion is expensive, she can ill-afford to raise a
child. She might choose an abortion because bearing and
rearing the child would cast her even more deeply into pover-
ty. Or she might decide she would prefer not to raise this child
alone. Whatever the reasons, we may deem her decision, like
the career woman's, an exercise of personal autonomy or
choice. Is it fair to do so? Are her options all equally available
or equally attractive to her? If consideration for the necessities
of life figure prominently in her decision so that she cannot
plausibly consider the option of raising the child, has she
made a choice to have an abortion? Or has this woman chosen
to forego the travails attending the decision not to have an
abortion?
Like the right to abortion, the right to assisted suicide has
been defended on the basis of an argument resting on personal
autonomy. 21 Right-to-die advocates who press the analogy
between abortion and assisted suicide talk about choosing
death as if the decision would be truly autonomous.0 2 Can it
201. The argument is sometimes based on the claim of a right to bodily integrity.
See Sedler, I Say No, supra note 4, at 730 ("An absolute ban on a terminally ill
person's receiving any assistance from a physician, or any other person, in imple-
menting her choice to hasten inevitable death is obviously an undue burden on her
fundamental right of bodily integrity."). The argument sometimes stems from a claim
of a right to self-determination. See Compassion in Dyingv. Washington, 49 F.3d 586,
596 (9th Cir. 1996) (Wright, J., dissenting) ("The right to die with dignity accords
with the American values of self-determination and privacy regarding personal
decisions."). As explained earlier, concepts such as bodily integrity and self-determi-
nation, however inappropriately, have been used interchangeably. See supra Part I.
202. See, e.g., Sedler, I Say No, supra note 4, at 731. Cf. John Harris, The Philo-
sophical Case Against the Philosophical Case Against Euthanasia, in EUTHANASIA
EXAMINED: ETHICAL, CLINICAL, AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 36 (John Keown ed., 1995). As
Harris contends:
If free choice matters ... it matters because of the effects of choosing, whether
those effects are defined as "side" or not. It is important to choose, because
choosing makes a difference. Now choosing makes a difference to the person
who chooses and it makes a difference to the world. The chooser is a world
maker and a character builder at the same time. The chooser is the sort of
character who creates this sort of world rather than that.... The disagreement
is over what counts as world building.... [For some] an agent only builds, and
is hence only responsible for, the worlds he intends. For me the agent chooses
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be? Would there be an argument in favor of legalizing (or
constitutionalizing) a right to euthanasia, "[slo long as there
are any persons dying in weakness and grief who are refused
their request for a speeding of their end?"
2 °3
No one can promise that a person "dying and in grief'
would make the choice to commit assisted suicide truly
autonomously, independently, voluntarily, and without
threat, burden, or persuasion from those around her.
Considerations for autonomy have not always figured so
prominently in the pro-assisted suicide position. To take but
one example, Professor Glanville Williams, a criminal law
scholar, once maintained:
If a patient, suffering pain in a terminal illness, wishes
for euthanasia partly because of his pain and partly
because he sees his beloved ones breaking under the
strain of caring for him, I do not see how this decision on
his part, agonizing though it might be, is necessarily a
matter of discredit either to the patient himself or to his
relatives. The fact is that, whether we are considering the
patient or his relatives, there are limits to human endur-
ance. 204
the world which she voluntarily creates, the world she could have chosen not
to create or to create differently, the world which results from her actions (or
conscious omissions).
Id. at 39-40. But see John Finnis, Misunderstanding the Case Against Euthanasia:
Response to Harris's First Reply, in EUTHANASIA EXAMINED: ETHICAL, CLINICAL, AND
LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 62 (John Keown ed., 1995). Finnis notes:
At the end of my first essay ... I argued that if one is really exercising auton-
omy (not merely yielding to impulse or compulsion) in choosing to kill oneself
or to be deliberately killed, one will be proceeding on one or both of two philo-
sophically and morally erroneous judgments; (i) that human life in certain
conditions or circumstances retains no intrinsic value or dignity; and/or (ii) that
the world would be a better place if one's life were intentionally terminated; and
that these erroneous judgments, being inherently universal, have grave implica-
tions for the weak and disabled .... The first of the two types of erroneous
judgment which I identified could be stated more exactly: (i) that one's human
life in certain conditions or circumstances retains no intrinsic value or dignity,
or on balance no net value, so that one's life is not worth living and one would
be better-off dead.
Id. at 70.
203. Glanville Williams, "Mercy Killing" Legislation-A Rejoinder, 43 MINN. L.
REV. 1, 8 (1958).
204. Id. at 5.
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Professor Williams noted that the argument favoring eutha-
nasia rested on two values: prevention of cruelty and liberty.
05
But imagine for a moment that Professor Williams' views had
been grounded solely or primarily on an argument from liberty
or personal autonomy. If so, would Professor Williams not
surely have been misguided for failing to accept that a would-
be assisted suicide's consideration for his family or his beloved
ones makes his decision not a purely autonomous one? And if
the choice to commit euthanasia is not an autonomous one,
would it not necessarily discredit the claim that it is? A matter
of discredit to the practice itself? Professor Williams, of course,
did not explicitly premise the claim for a right to assisted
suicide solely (or primarily) on a concept of personal autono-
my. Unlike Williams, however, modern right-to-die proponents
premise their constitutional theory on just such a claim.
It is just as much of a mistake to talk about a right to
assisted suicide as a meaningful exercise of personal autono-
my as it is to talk about the right to abortion in such terms.
Even if the right to commit assisted suicide could be defend-
ed on principles of autonomy, it would not principally be a
decision made autonomously. Indeed, when has a defender of
that right said it is? But what if it is not? Assisted suicide is
no less autonomous a decision than a woman's decision to
have an abortion, and the abortion decision receives constitu-
tional protection. Whatever force such a position may have, it
does not amount to a theory about why abortion and assisted
suicide ought to be treated similarly as a constitutional mat-
ter.
20 6
Despite the fact that neither the abortion nor the assisted
suicide decision is meaningfully autonomous, there is reason
205. Id. at 1-2.
206. If abortion and assisted suicide are in any way analogous, why should the
assisted suicide decision be viewed (as assisted suicide advocates must think) as
more like the seemingly autonomous decision of the married woman with a career
to have an abortion, and less like that of the poor single woman making the same
decision? Such questions are unsavory, but cannot be avoided. Before too quickly
moving from a constitutional right to abortion to a constitutional right to assisted
suicide, we must come to terms with what personal autonomy, or even autonomy
means.
If some people cannot bear their pain and suffering and cannot obtain the relief
medical science can provide, how can we say that they have voluntarily and autono-
mously decided to commit assisted suicide? Or if some people will exercise a right to
assisted suicide because they can no longer live, as they have, a life in relation to
others, is the decision to end their lives really autonomous? Admittedly the answers
to these questions are far from clear, but we must start asking the questions.
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to suppose that as a social (or constitutional) matter, we need
not engage in the fiction that they are. Consider, first, the
right to abortion. We may have our moral doubts about this
right. But any error we might make by placing the abortion
decision in a woman's hands will not foreclose the possibility
that, at some future date, when that woman's circumstances
or way of thinking has changed, she will go on to bear and to
rear a child. Moreover, our conviction about the good achieved
by leaving the choice in the woman's hands and, thereby, pro-
moting women's social equality, prevents us from taking the
choice away from her. Accordingly, as a society, we may
permit abortions.
The case of assisted suicide presents us with an entirely
different equation. If, as a society, we are uncertain about the
propriety of allowing an individual to commit assisted sui-
cide, we might not be willing to indulge in the fiction that her
decision to do so is an autonomous choice. Unlike with abbr-
tion, we cannot assuage our moral uncertainty that it is an
error to allow an individual to commit assisted suicide with
the belief that someday the person will make a different
decision under different circumstances. The choice to commit
assisted suicide, once carried out, is always irreversible. °7
Moreover, unlike the case of abortion, we cannot rely on any
deeply felt and deeply held moral conviction that it is best to
allow the individual to make this decision. Any sense we may
have that enabling individuals to decide whether, when, and
how to avoid suffering, does not rise to the level of our con-
viction about the righteousness of promoting women's equali-
ty-especially because the best medical evidence strongly
suggests that much of the suffering of those most likely to
commit assisted suicide occurs needlessly.
208
Based upon those differences, we need not (and should not)
strike the same balance in the case of abortion as in the case
of assisted suicide. Neither abortion nor assisted suicide is a
purely autonomous decision, however. When viewed from the
decision maker's perspective it becomes clear that there are
207. Recall that this argument is meant to explain how we, as a society, may
distinguish the abortion and assisted suicide decisions from the decision maker's
perspective. The fact that from a fetus' point of view the abortion decision is irre-
versible does not affect this point.
208. For a thorough discussion of the clinical responses to pain and suffering,
see THE NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, WHEN DEATH IS SOUGHT:
ASSISTED SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA IN THE MEDICAL CONTEXT 35-47 (1994).
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reasons to defend a woman's right to abortion but balk at a
right to assisted suicide.
2. Society's Perspective on the Lives Ended by Abortion
and Assisted Suicide-Abortion and physician-assisted sui-
cide differ from one another not only in terms of what these
two decisions may mean for the decision maker, but also in
terms of the social value attached to the lives they end.
Although as a philosophical, moral, or theological proposition,
all life, pre- and post-natal alike, may have the same intrin-
sic value, much of our society, as well as a majority of the
Supreme Court, does not regard potential and post-natal life
as equal.
This section treats two examples of this social understand-
ing. It first demonstrates the different values attached to
potential and post-natal human life by suggesting that, al-
though many may think that economic considerations justify
a woman's decision to terminate an unwanted pregnancy,
few, if any, would argue that such considerations should play
into an individual's decision to end her life. It then points to
the distinction our society draws between abortion and in-
fanticide as evidence that our society attaches different val-
ues to potential and post-natal human life.
Advocates of a right to physician-assisted suicide would
rarely, if ever, admit that that right would turn human life
into a commodity. Rarely does one hear an argument that
someone should decide to end her life because of the financial
cost of continuing it or the savings that could be realized
from her decision to do so.2°9
It is no accident that the literature on the Dutch experi-
ment with euthanasia,21 ° especially that part of the literature
defending the continuation of the experiment, takes pains to
209. But see Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1429, 1434 (D. Or. 1995) (arguing in
support of the constitutionality of the Oregon law allowing a terminally ill adult to
get a doctor's prescription to end her life, the state defended the law on the ground
that the state has an interest in "protecting the terminally ill and their loved ones
from financial hardships they wish to avoid"). For useful discussions of the Oregon
law, see Daniel Callahan & Margot White, The Legalization of Physician-Assisted
Suicide: Creating a Regulatory Potemkin Village, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 1, 22-69 (1996)
and Edward R. Grant & Paul Benjamin Linton, Relief or Reproach?: Euthanasia
Rights in the Wake of Measure 16, 74 OR. L. REV. 449 (1995).
210. See, e.g., John Keown, Euthanasia in the Netherlands: Sliding Down the
Slippery Slope?, in EUTHANASIA EXAMINED: ETHICAL, CLINICAL, AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES
261 (John Keown ed., 1995). For a highly regarded report of the Dutch euthanasia
experience, see CARLOS F. GOMEz, REGULATING DEATH: EUTHANASIA AND THE CASE OF THE
NETHERLANDS (1991).
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point out that because of the nationalized system of health
care in the Netherlands, individuals who decide to exercise
the right to die do not make the choice on account of their
inability to afford adequate health care.211 For example, Henk
Rigter reports that
foreign commentators occasionally wonder whether eco-
nomic motives play a role in the [Dutch] practice of
euthanasia. The answer is no. In the relatively well-
funded health care system of The Netherlands there is no
economic stimulus for doctors or institutions to end the
lives of patients. Dutch general physicians even lose
money by performing euthanasia because of the per
capita reimbursement system.212
However accurate Rigter's remarks, they do not preclude the
possibility that economics may play a role in an individual's
decision to hasten his death actively-even in the Nether-
lands. Although Rigter's remarks may, if true, go some
distance toward dispelling the concern that financial consid-
erations might motivate physicians to help their patients kill
themselves, they do not address the full panoply of concerns
about the economic motivations that could prompt an individu-
al to end her life.
Opponents of the practice of assisted suicide still have
legitimate concerns that economics may play an untoward
role in a legal system in which such a practice is permitted.
They worry that individuals would decide to end their lives
for the "wrong reasons," such as: (a) the financial circum-
stances that would not permit her to afford available forms of
medical treatment that could alleviate her pain and suffer-
ing, (b) the financial burden on her family, or (c) the coercion
by those around her for the purpose of financial gain from
insurance.
There is also the less immediate, though by no means un-
founded concern that allowing economics to play a role in end-
of-life decisions might reduce life to some quantifiable sum of
money. Though our society quantifies the value of life through,
211. See, e.g., Leonard M. Fleck, Just Caring: Assisted Suicide and Health Care
Rationing, 72 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 873, 889 (1995); Kamisar, supra note 9, at 768.
212. Henk Rigter, Euthanasia in the Netherlands: Distinguishing Facts from
Fiction, HASTINGS CENTER REP.-A SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT, Jan.-Feb. 1989, at 31, 32.
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for example, wrongful death awards21 or life insurance poli-
cies, these are not generally considered to represent the value
of actual life, or to constitute a substitute for the living
person."' The reduction of the value of life to a quantifiable
figure raises concerns that in the process, life becomes merely
another commodity to be bought, sold, or dispensed with as
the marketplace-or worse, politics-demands.21
Although it may be thought inappropriate or detrimental to
permit economic considerations to play a role in an individu-
al's decision to end her life, the same cannot be said of a
woman's reasons for choosing to have an abortion. Even the
Supreme Court has recognized that it may not be improper
for a pregnant woman to decide to obtain an abortion out of a
concern that she will be unable to provide for the child. In
drawing a parallel between the abortion decision and those
decisions regarding the use of contraception, the Casey joint
opinion pointed out that reasonable people may hold different
views about whether the decision to bear or beget a child
should properly be influenced by economic concerns, com-
menting:
As with abortion, reasonable people will have differences
of opinions about these matters [the meaning of procreation
and human responsibility and respect for it]. One view is
213. Cf Green v. Bittner, 424 A.2d 210, 215 (N.J. 1980) (limiting measure of
recovery for wrongful death of high school senior because state statute limited
recovery to "pecuniary injuries," which did not include emotional loss).
214. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 197 (4th ed. 1992). As
Judge Posner observes:
Damage awards for pain and suffering, even when apparently generous, may
well undercompensate victims seriously crippled by accidents .... The prob-
lem is most acute in a death case. Most people would not exchange their lives
for anything less than an infinite sum of money if the exchange were to take
place immediately, since they would have so little time in which to enjoy the
proceeds of the sale. Yet it cannot be correct that the proper award of damages
in a death case is infinite. This would imply that the optimum rate of fatal
accidents was zero, or very close to it. . . and it is plain that people are unwill-
ing, individually or collectively, to incur the costs necessary to reduce the rate
of fatal accidents so drastically.
Id.
215. This view of what effects assisted suicide may cause is similar in important
respects to the feminist anti-pornography argument that perceives the real harm to
be that inflicted upon the human being whose life is objectified and reduced to a
commodity. See, e.g., ANDREA DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN
101-28 (1981).
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based on such reverence for the wonder of creation that any
pregnancy ought to be welcomed and carried to full term
no matter how difficult it will be to provide for the child
and ensure its well-being. Another is that the inability to
provide for the nurture and care of the infant is a cruelty
to the child and an anguish to the parent. These are inti-
mate views with infinite variations, and their deep, person-
al character underlay our decisions in Griswold, Eisenstadt,
and Carey. The same concerns are present when the woman
confronts the reality that, perhaps despite her attempts to
avoid it, she has become pregnant.216
Even though society generally deems economic considerations
an improper factor to consider in deciding to commit assisted
suicide, it may not have the same qualms regarding the
abortion decision. The reason for the difference may be at-
tributed to the different values society assigns to potential
and post-natal life.
That our society may attach a different value to potential
and post-natal life can also be seen in the different ways our
society treats abortion and infanticide.217 While abortion is
constitutionally protected under a variety of circumstances,
infanticide remains a crime in every state.21 As the Supreme
Court noted in Roe, at common law, abortion was not an
indictable offense before quickening; it did not constitute an
act of homicide.21 9 Infanticide, on the other hand, was always
an indictable offense at common law, and constituted an act
of homicide.22 °
One reason offered to explain why we treat abortion and
infanticide differently is that we are more able to identify our
interests in infants than in fetuses.221 If so, the case for
216. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 853 (1992).
217. Compare MICHAEL TOOLEY, ABORTION AND INFANTICIDE (1983) (arguing for the
equivalence of the lives of fetuses and infants and suggesting that both abortion and
infanticide be permitted) with Strauss, supra note 186, at 9 (arguing that "the intu-
ition against infanticide is so strong and widespread that a theory that can 'resolve'
the abortion issue only by justifying infanticide has not resolved the abortion issue
(or perhaps has supplied a strong argument against allowing abortion)").
218. 40 AM. JUR. 2D Homicide § 9 (1964).
219. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 132 (1973).
220. 40 AM. JUR. 2D Homicide § 9 (1964).
221. See, e.g., Seidman, supra note 137, at 63. Some criticize this view by point-
ing out that, just as we will never again become fetuses, limiting our ability to
identify with them, neither will we ever again become infants. Id.
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distinguishing between abortion and assisted suicide is that
much stronger because the interests in this context are our
own.
3. Differences from the Viewpoint of the Medical Profes-
sion-In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court expressly relied on
the official position of the medical establishment, which
approved abortion under certain circumstances, to bolster its
constitutional ruling.222 Following the Roe Court's lead, then,
courts should consider the rules governing the conduct of
physicians in the practice of medicine. The most powerful
statement from the medical establishment in opposition to
physician-assisted suicide comes from the American Medical
Association's Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs (AMA),
which unflinchingly declares that "physicians must not ...
participate in assisted suicide." '223 Other medical organiza-
tions, as well, have gone on record expressing similar, though
less strongly worded, views.224 If the stance of several major
medical organizations, including the AMA, influenced the Su-
preme Court in Roe to recognize a woman's right to terminate
a pregnancy,"' the stance of the AMA and other medical
organizations likewise should lead courts to reject a right to
assisted suicide.
222. Roe, 410 U.S. at 141-47 (noting the positions of the American Medical
Association and the American Public Health Association).
223. See THE NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, supra note 208,
at 108-09 & n. 115 (discussing the AMA's position and citing the official language of
the AMA's position on euthanasia and assisted suicide). Just this past June, the
AMA's 430-member House of Delegates, the policy-making body of the organization
(with near unanimity) "reaffirmed its adamant opposition to physician-assisted
suicide." AMA Soundly Reaffirms Policy on Opposing Physician-Assisted Suicide,
U.S. NEWSWIRE, June 25, 1996, available in 1996 WL 5622248. Nancy W. Dickey,
M.D., chair of the American Medical Association's Board of Trustees, stated:
'To allow or force physicians to participate in actively ending the lives of
patients would so dramatically and fundamentally change the entire pa-
tient/physician relationship that it would undermine the principles we, as a
society, hold most dear. We must never lose sight of the caveat that physicians
are healers, and where we cannot heal, our role is to comfort.'
Id. This is perhaps as momentous a set-back for assisted-suicide proponents as
recent federal court developments have been victories. One doubts that the federal
courts will trump the judgment of the AMA with a constitutional ace.
224. See id. at 108-09 & nn.111-15 (discussing the views of the American
College of Physicians, the American Geriatrics Society, the Committee on Bioethical
Issues of the Medical Society of the State of New York, the National Hospice
Organization, and the American Nurses Association).
225. See supra note 222.
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It is sometimes said that doctors must participate in assist-
ed suicide because they can prescribe medication and advise
a patient on what will constitute a lethal dose. As a result, so
the argument goes, doctors can help guarantee against the
possibility that an individual will not succeed in ending her
life by suicide.
This argument misses its mark. Most would-be suicides are
quite capable of concocting or consuming a death-inducing
potion, or of otherwise ending their lives without a doctor's
assistance. Undoubtedly, the assistance of a spouse, pharma-
cist, close friend, or enemy, is as likely as a physician's script
and advice to result in a "safe delivery from life."22
Indeed, the argument for assisted suicide rests on the safe-
guards that inhere in the very act itself: It is the would-be
suicide, and not some third party, that undertakes the last,
death-causing act herself.22 7 But if a doctor's involvement in
assisted suicide is limited to providing medication and in-
structions on how to take it in lethal doses, there can be no
promise that a patient will accomplish the task of ending her
life. Short of guiding a patient's hand during the course of a
suicide, physicians can do little to guarantee against the
possibility of a failed suicide attempt. If avoidance of this sort
of mistake is what assisted-suicide advocates mean to pre-
vent, why should the patient's right be limited to assisted
suicide? Surely, fewer botched suicides would take place if
physicians were permitted to take the next, and more reli-
able, step of administering the deadly dose themselves.
In marked contrast, a pregnant woman who attempts to
procure an abortion without a physician's assistance could
cause herself serious injury in the process, and still might not
succeed in completing the act. Thus, a physician is required to
ensure that a pregnant woman's decision is safely executed.22
Physician-assisted suicide and abortion differ in the need for a
physician to participate in the act.229
226. See Callahan & White, supra note 209 (quoting Herbert Hendin, Selling
Death and Dignity, HASTINGS CENTER REP., May-June 1995, at 19).
227. See Kamisar, supra note 3.
228. A physician's assistance in dispensing and supervising the consumption of
abortifacients, such as RU 486, is more than a simple convenience. As David M.
Smolin writes, 'RU 486 technology requires several visits to a medical facility and
extensive medical supervision." David M. Smolin, Cultural and Technological Obsta-
cles to the Mainstreaming of Abortion, 13 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 261, 279 (1993).
Moreover, Smolin continues, RU 486 "in some ways requires more medical care and
time than that required for early surgical abortion." Id.
229. For a more comprehensive study of the role physicians should (or should
not) play in assisted suicide, see Ninth Circuit Ignores Medical Experience at Our
Peril, [July-Aug. 1996] II BioLaw (Univ. Pub. Am), at S159.
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This Part has argued that even if the Supreme Court's rec-
ognition of the abortion right were broad enough to include a
right to assisted suicide as a matter of logic or principle, there
are important legal and cultural distinctions between the two
practices. It has pointed out that these distinctions provide
courts ample grounds on which to maintain the constitutional
status quo in which a woman's right to choose abortion is
constitutionally protected though a right to assisted suicide is
not. The implicit premise has been that not only can courts
distinguish between abortion and assisted suicide, but also
that they should do just that.
The Supreme Court's opinion in Hardwick and the joint
opinion in Casey underscored the point that concerns over the
institutional legitimacy of the Court properly play a role in
constitutional adjudication. In Hardwick, the Court empha-
sized that the Court's interest in preserving its institutional
legitimacy cut in favor of resisting any expansion of the cate-
gory of unenumerated constitutional rights, because the right
at issue in the case had no longstanding history or tradition
in our country and bore no resemblance to the category of
rights previously recognized as protected by the Due Process
Clause. In contrast, the Casey joint opinion suggested that
concerns over institutional legitimacy counseled in favor of
continuing to recognize a woman's right to abortion, lest the
Court be perceived to be succumbing to political pressure to
overturn Roe. The Supreme Court has made clear in these
and other cases that courts should take care to tread with
extreme caution in the shadows of the Constitution's
unwritten text. Thus, courts should resist the temptation to
ignore the legal and cultural distinctions between abortion
and assisted suicide detailed above, and should rule squarely
that the right to assisted suicide does not flow flawlessly as a
constitutional matter from the Supreme Court's recognition
that pregnant women have a Fourteenth Amendment "liberty
interest," under certain circumstances, to terminate an
unwanted pregnancy. And courts should hold that no
one-not even the terminally ill-has a Fourteenth
Amendment "liberty interest" in committing assisted suicide.
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CONCLUSION
When courts decide constitutional cases of major social
importance involving enumerated, as well as unenumerated
rights, they do so (or should) based on the best available
evidence of what the text, the structure, and the principles of
the Constitution require. There are very few cases of major
social importance, however, in which the text, the structure,
and the principles of the Constitution speak with the preci-
sion of an architect's blueprint. The proper resolution of most
constitutional cases is not patently obvious; the easy cases
are not usually those courts are called upon to decide.
To state that a right is constitutionally protected, for the
most part, has lost its punch in our rights-obsessed culture.
Still, when the Supreme Court exercises its "authority finally
to speak of [the Constitution], "23 it still must do so in
principles "capable of unremitting application,"231 and the lines
it draws must be clear, unequivocal, and defensible. Because
the Constitution is "a covenant running from the first
generation of Americans to us and then to future gen-
erations,"232 the Supreme Court's pronouncements regarding
its meaning must be sure-footed enough to withstand the test
of time233-especially when the Court makes constitutional
230. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COUiR AT
THE BAR OF POLITICS 32 (1986).
231. Id. at 58. As Bickel explains:
If, in order to be workable in our society as it actually exists, a rule of action
must be modulated by pragmatic compromises, then that rule is not a princi-
ple; it is no more than a device of expediency. And it is for legislatures, not
courts, to impose what are merely solutions of expediency. Courts must act on
true principles, capable of unremitting application. When they cannot find
such a principle, they are bound to declare the legislative choice valid. No
other course is open to them.
Id.
232. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 901 (1992).
233. As Professor Ely wrote:
To the extent "progress" is to concern the Justices at all, it should be defined
not in terms of what they would like it to be but rather in terms of their best
estimate of what over time the American people will make it-that is, they
should seek "durable" decisions.
Ely, supra note 174, at 946 (footnote omitted).
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judgments in the absence of a clear constitutional mandate,
such as when it relies on malleable concepts like liberty or sub-
stantive due process.234 The Supreme Court, which lacks power
to enforce its holdings, must ensure that the Constitution func-
tions as a "coherent succession."235 It ought, therefore, to resolve
constitutional cases "with an ear to the promptings of the past
and an eye strained to a vision of the future much more than
with close regard to the present."236 In short, it is part of the
Court's obligation to deduce, and then announce, constitutional
rules and rights, particularly new ones, which, because they are
based on principled justifications that are "beyond dispute," will
endure over the years. As the Court explained in Casey:
The underlying substance of [the Court's] legitimacy is of
course the warrant for the Court's decisions in the Consti-
tution and the lesser sources of legal principle on which
the Court draws. That substance is expressed in the
Court's opinion, and our contemporary understanding is
such that a decision without principled justification would
be no judicial act at all. But even when justification is
furnished by apposite legal principle, something more is
required. Because not every conscientious claim of princi-
pled justification will be accepted as such, the justification
claimed must be beyond dispute. The Court must take care
to speak and act in ways that allow people to accept its
decision on the terms the Court claims for them, as
grounded truly in principle, not as compromises with social
and political pressures having, as such, no bearing on the
principle choices that the Court is obliged to make.
The Court's track record of announcing durable decisions in
the area of substantive due process has been marred by mis-
steps and reversal. In the early part of the century, for exam-
ple, the Supreme Court declared in Lochner v. New York23 and
its progeny 239 that the Constitution imposed substantive limi-
tations on legislative decision making concerning individuals'
234. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 25-30 (1975).
235. Casey, 505 U.S. at 901.
236. BICKEL, supra note 234, at 26.
237. Casey, 505 U.S. at 865-66.
238. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
239. E.g., Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923), overruled by West
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
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freedom of contract. 240 This view had a relatively short life,
lasting only about thirty years.241
Reflecting on the Lochner era, several Supreme Court Jus-
tices recently remarked that by the time the Court reduced its
scope in West Coast Hotel Company v. Parrish,242 Lochner's
economic theories were widely perceived as unmistakably
flawed. 243 The Great Depression had demonstrated the error
of relying on the "capacity of a relatively unregulated market
to satisfy minimal levels of human welfare."244 Commenting on
the propriety of rejecting Lochner's theory, these Justices
explained that
the facts upon which [Lochner] had premised a constitu-
tional resolution of social controversy had proven to be
untrue, and history's demonstration of their untruth not
only justified but required the new choice of constitution-
al principle that West Coast Hotel announced. Of course,
it was true that the Court lost something by its misper-
ception, or its lack of prescience, and the Courtpacking
crisis only magnified the loss; but the clear demonstration
that the facts of economic life were different from those
previously assumed warranted the repudiation of the old
law.2 45
240. Id. at 545 (declaring that it was settled that the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment protected one's right "to contract about one's affairs").
241. Adkins was overturned by West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379
(1937), ending the Lochner era that began in 1905.
242. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
243. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 861-62
(1992).
244. Id.
245. Casey, 505 U.S. at 862. That the Supreme Court so candidly acknowledged
that its constitutional adjudication involves a dose of prescience, although some-
what surprising, should not come as a revelation. Legal commentators have long
maintained that the Court's constitutional judgments involve such a calculation.
Consider what Professor Bickel had to say on the matter:
We tend to think of the Court as deciding, but more often than not it merely
ratifies or, what is even less, does not disapprove, or less still, decides not to
decide. And even when it does take it upon itself to strike a balance of values,
it does so with an ear to the promptings of the past and an eye strained to a
vision of the future much more than with close regard to the present. ,
BICKEL, supra note 234, at 26.
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This Article has argued that there are strong reasons to
think that the theory that buttresses a woman's right to
choose an abortion, the theory of personal autonomy or bodily
integrity, is flawed,246 but the Supreme Court has never
squarely held so. 247 Still, while affirming Roe's "essential
holding," the Casey joint opinion acknowledged that the criti-
cisms of Roe were not wholly unfounded.248 Responding to the
sharp edge of such criticisms, the joint opinion explained that
the abortion right could not be weeded out of the Constitu-
tion simply because Roe drew "a specific rule from what in
the Constitution is but a general standard."24 9 As the authors
of the joint opinion concluded:
[T]he urgent claims of the woman to retain the ultimate
control over her destiny and her body, claims implicit in
the meaning of liberty, require us to perform that func-
tion [of drawing a specific rule, i.e., the right to abortion,
from a general constitutional standard]. Liberty must not
be extinguished for want of a line that is clear. 5 '
One should not mistake the powerful elegance of the joint
opinion's remarks as embracing a mode of constitutional
adjudication that would permit the Court to draw specific
constitutional rules from general constitutional standards
while disregarding whether such rules would likely endure.251
In fact, in reining in the abortion right as it did, the authors
of the Casey joint opinion sought to end the national debate
over the constitutional right to abortion, and to mold a con-
stitutional right to abortion that would last for generations.
It is one thing to hold, as the Casey joint opinion did, that
"[1]iberty must not be extinguished for want of a line that is
clear,"252 but it is another matter entirely to conclude that the
Court should announce a previously unknown aspect of liber-
ty, such as the right to assisted suicide, in the absence of a
246. See supra Part I (explaining that the theories of privacy and liberty are
flawed).
247. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 846.
248. Id. at 869.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. For a wonderful discussion of rules and standards, see generally Kathleen
M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Forward: The Justices of Rules and
Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992).
252. Casey, 505 U.S. at 869.
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clear line.253 And it must be noted, once again, that there are
no clear lines where assisted suicide is concerned.254
To extrude even an extremely narrow, circumscribable right
to physician-assisted suicide for the terminally ill from the
Fourteenth Amendment's promise of liberty is no small
undertaking.255 Proponents of assisted suicide have not crafted
a constitutional theory that approaches such a high standard.
They have not because they cannot-and they know it. In-
stead, assisted suicide advocates maintain that the common
law and constitutional traditions of bodily integrity already
have created a rule easily applied to the case of the terminally
ill who wish to "hasten inevitable death."256 They are mistak-
en.25 As the continued ferocity of the abortion debate well
demonstrates, even if all Americans agreed that individuals
have a right to liberty or bodily integrity, they would seriously
disagree about what that right would entail in individual
cases.
Admittedly, the argument extending the logic of the Court's
abortion jurisprudence to support a constitutional right to
assisted suicide has some appeal. Taken to its extreme,
though, the logic of the Court's abortion jurisprudence would
support numerous other rights, including a right to active
voluntary euthanasia.258 It is important to underscore that
the logic of Roe becomes more controversial and disputed
when applied to situations substantially different from the
abortion decision. Those who would take the Constitution and
our society beyond Roe to a right to assisted suicide must
establish beyond doubt that the reasons for recognizing the
right and the right itself will prove durable.259
This Article has devoted considerable attention to the ways
in which courts can distinguish between the right to abortion
253. The Supreme Court has intimated that when a clear constitutional line
cannot be found, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194-95 (1986), or when found,
cannot be sustained, Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 300
(1990) (Scalia, J., concurring), it may be error to hold that the general constitutional
standard of liberty is implicated in a concrete way.
254. See supra Part I.
255. As Daniel Callahan and Margot White have observed, creating a system
permitting a limited exercise of physician-assisted suicide under precise, clinical
circumstances verges on the impossible. Callahan & White, supra note 209, at 1.
256. See supra Part II.A. See also Sedler, Hastening Inevitable Death, supra note
2, at 20.
257. See supra Part II.
258. See supra Part II.A.
259. See Ely, supra note 174.
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and the right to assisted suicide,26 0 and in light of the preceding
observations, it again urges that courts should distinguish
between the two. Not only is this result directed by the
Supreme Court's recent substantive due process juris-
prudence,26 but it is also the wisest course for courts to follow
as a matter of constitutional rule making. Affirming a distinc-
tion between abortion and assisted suicide may be the last, best
chance for courts to avoid tacking into the center of a political
whirlwind that would make the one occasioned by Roe look like
a blown kiss.
260. See supra Parts I and III.
261. See supra Part I.
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SOME OBSERVATIONS ON RECENT CASES
This past March, two cases that had been wending their way
through the judicial pipeline burst forth with a force that was
impossible to ignore. In separate rulings, two federal courts of
appeals held prohibitions on the commission of physician-
assisted suicide unconstitutional. The Ninth Circuit, sitting en
banc in Compassion in Dying v. Washington262 was the first to
announce its decision, but the Second Circuit in Quill v. Vacco
263
quickly followed suit, though on a different constitutional theory.
Then, on October 1, 1996, (just as this Article was going to
press) the Supreme Court granted certiorari in both cases.
The two appellate decisions constitute a marked shift in the
legal battle over the so-called right to die. Although at the mo-
ment, the balance may seem to favor proponents of such a right,
I continue to believe that this particular balance will not endure.
Compassion in Dying v. Washington
The Ninth Circuit's opinion in Compassion in Dying blazed a
brand new trail. Not convinced that the Fourteenth Amendment
could protect only the right of a terminally ill individual to
commit assisted suicide, the Ninth Circuit explained that such
a narrow right could not exist in the absence of a broader
"liberty interest in controlling the time and manner of one's
death" (a liberty interest not exclusively limited to the termi-
nally ill).2 64 Undeterred by the expansiveness of the right, or the
lack of support for such a right in the text or structure of the
Constitution, the Ninth Circuit boldly declared that it is protect-
ed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.26
The Ninth Circuit based its unprecedented ruling in large
measure on the Supreme Court's abortion jurisprudence.
Noting past abortion decisions, including Roe and Casey,266 the
262. 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc), cert. granted, Washington v. Glucksberg,
65 U.S.L.W. 3085 (U.S. Oct. 1, 1996) (No. 96-110).
263. 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. granted, Vacco v. Quill, 64 U.S.L.W. 3795
(U.S. Oct. 1, 1996) (No. 95-1858).
264. 79 F.3d at 816.
265. See id.
266. See id. at 801.
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court invoked the "compelling similarities" 2 67 between abortion
and assisted suicide. The court noted that the two practices re-
semble one another in that "the relative strength of the com-
peting interests [in each case] changes as physical, medical, or
related circumstances vary," and "[elqually important," that
"both types of cases raise issues of life and death, and both
arouse similar religious and moral concerns. 2 68 According to
the court even "[hlistorical evidence" demonstrates the simi-
larities between abortion and assisted suicide: "Deprived of the
right to medical assistance [historically], many pregnant
women and terminally ill adults ultimately took matters into
their own hands, often with tragic consequences. 2 69 Thus, the
court reasons that "[in deciding right-to-die cases, we are
guided by the [Supreme] Court's approach to the abortion cas-
es."
270
The Ninth Circuit adopts the analogy between abortion and
the "right to die" without any mention of the distinctions be-
tween the practices.27' When a court sits to render a sensitive
constitutional judgment in a case that it believes "may touch
more people more profoundly than any other issue the courts
will face in the foreseeable future,"272 it seems reasonable to
expect that it would provide a thorough explanation of the
rationale for its decision. At a minimum, such a discussion
ought to include at least passing references to the differences
between the two practices.
"The Most Intimate and Personal Choices:"
Of Casey and Hardwick
One of the disturbing aspects of the Ninth Circuit's opinion
is its reading of the Supreme Court's opinion in Casey. Early
in its opinion, the court writes:
Although Casey was influenced by the doctrine of stare
decisis, the fundamental message of that case lies in its
statements regarding the type of issue that confronts us
267. Id. at 800.
268. Id. at 800-01.
269. Id. at 801.
270. Id.
271. See discussion supra Part II.
272. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 793.
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here: "These matters, involving the most intimate and
personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices
central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to
the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment."
2 73
To reduce Casey's detailed and deliberate treatment of stare
decisis to a mere "influence" on the "fundamental message" of
the case, is to misunderstand Casey. Only by dismissing the
impact of stare decisis on Casey could the court use that case
as a springboard for the further expansion of substantive due
process rights.
The "personal choices" language from Casey provides more
than just a leitmotif for the court's discovery of a liberty
interest in determining the time and manner of one's death. In
a passage as noteworthy for its chilling, if biased, rhetoric as
for its substance, the court states:
Like the decision of whether or not to have an abortion,
the decision how and when to die is one of "the most
intimate and personal choices a person may make in a
lifetime," a choice "central to personal dignity and autono-
my." A competent terminally ill adult, having lived nearly
the full measure of his life, has a strong liberty interest in
choosing a dignified and humane death rather than being
reduced at the end of his existence to a childlike state of
helplessness, diapered, sedated, incontinent. How a person
dies not only determines the nature of the final period of
his existence, but in many cases, the enduring memories
held by those who love him.274
Not content to leave off there, the court continues:
Prohibiting a terminally ill patient from hastening his
death may have an even more profound impact on that
person's life than forcing a woman to carry a pregnancy to
term.... For... patients, wracked by pain and deprived
of all pleasure, a state-enforced prohibition on hastening
their deaths condemns them to unrelieved misery or tor-
ture. Surely, a person's decision whether to endure or
avoid such an existence constitutes one of the most, if not
273. Id. at 801 (citing Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 851 (1992)).
274. Id. at 813-14.
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the most, "intimate and personal choices a person may
make in a life-time," a choice that is "central to personal
dignity and autonomy." Surely, such a decision implicates
a most vital liberty interest.275
Within the span of a few paragraphs, the Ninth Circuit
converts the "personal choices" language from Casey into what
amounts to a talisman for determining which decisions are
protected by the Due Process Clause. The court incants that
"[there is no litmus test for courts to apply when deciding
whether or not a liberty interest exists under the Due Process
Clause."276 But the court's lavish reading of "personal choices"
checks one's willingness to believe that the Ninth Circuit, at
least, has no substantive due process "litmus test" to apply.
Not only does the Ninth Circuit opinion overplay the "per-
sonal choices" language from Casey by underplaying Casey's
discussion of stare decisis, it also shreds the fabric of the
Supreme Court's substantive due process quilt. In this regard,
notice how the court questions the force of Hardwick.
The Ninth Circuit opens with two observations unbefitting
of a careful exposition of constitutional doctrine. The court
notes that Justice Powell, who provided the fifth vote in the
5-4 Hardwick decision, "subsequently announced on several
occasions that he regretted that vote, 277 and that "[u]pon re-
reading the opinion a few months after it was issued, he
reportedly remarked, 'I thought the dissent had the better of
the argument.' " 278 The court then states that Hardwick "has
been widely criticized by commentators."279 If these statements
are arguments supporting the Ninth Circuit's decision not to
follow Hardwick, they do not make sense.
A bit more persuasively, the court strikes at Hardwick a
second time. After confirming that the Supreme Court's earlier
privacy cases all "involve decisions that are highly personal
and intimate, as well as of great importance to the individual,"
the court adds in a footnote that Hardwick "would appear to
be aberrant and to turn on the specific sexual acts at issue."
Entirely without explanation, the opinion concludes:
We do not believe that [Hardwick's] holding controls the
outcome here or is in any way inconsistent with our
275. Id. at 814 (citation omitted).
276. Id. at 802.
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conclusion that there is a liberty interest in dying peace-
fully and with dignity. We also note, without surprise,
that in the decade since [Hardwick] was handed down the
Court has never cited its central holding approvingly.8 °
Now, it may be true enough that the Supreme Court has
not cited Hardwick's central holding approvingly in the de-
cade since that decision was handed down-but neither has
the Supreme Court cited Hardwick's central holding disap-
provingly in the past decade. Even if, as the Ninth Circuit's
opinion implies, the Supreme Court were in the process of
allowing Hardwick to wither slowly on the vine (a withering
I would not be at all sorry to witness) until the High Court
expressly overrules that decision, it continues to bind lower
28courts. 81 Without more, the court's skeletal conclusion that
Hardwick does not control the outcome in Compassion in
Dying, and is not "in any way inconsistent with" that decision
is unpersuasive.
The Ninth Circuit's opinion maintains that the Supreme
Court's abortion jurisprudence supports its conclusion that
individuals have a constitutionally protected liberty interest
in "determining the time and manner" of their deaths.2"2 This
contention is not true, however, if one faithfully adheres to
prevailing Supreme Court doctrine and precedent.
State's Interest Analysis as Policy Judgment
Having found a liberty interest in choosing the time and
manner of one's death, the Ninth Circuit undertakes to
balance this liberty against the state's interests, ultimately
ruling that the terminally ill have a right to physician-assisted
suicide. Under either the balancing test that the Ninth Circuit
employs, or the "undue burden" standard it should have
employed, the court ought to have reasoned that the state's
compelling interest in preserving and protecting human life
permits a state to prohibit assisted suicide.
280. Id. at 813 n.65.
281. Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 725 (2d Cir. 1996) (noting that "[olur position in
the judicial hierarchy constrains us to be even more reluctant than the Court to
undertake an expansive approach" while broadening the concept of substantive due
process to include a right to physician-assisted suicide).
282. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 812-14.
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The Ninth Circuit commences its analysis of the state's
interest in preserving and protecting human life with a con-
cession: "[Tihe state's interest in preserving life may be un-
qualified, and may be asserted regardless of the quality of the
life or lives at issue.... But the opinion quickly adds a
peculiar caveat: "that interest is not always controlling."28 4 The
strength of the state's interest in preserving life, the court
explains, is not "of the same strength in each case";28 5 rather,
its strength depends "on relevant circumstances, including the
medical condition and the wishes of the person whose life is at
stake."28 6 The court writes:
[E]ven though the protection of life is one of the state's
most important functions, the state's interest is dramati-
cally diminished if the person it seeks to protect is ter-
minally ill or permanently comatose and has expressed a
wish that he be permitted to die without further medical
treatment (or if a duly appointed representative has done
so on his behalf). When patients are no longer able to
pursue liberty or happiness and do not wish to pursue life,
the state's interest in forcing them to remain alive is
clearly less compelling. Thus, while the state may still
seek to prolong the lives of terminally ill or comatose
patients, or more likely to enact regulations that will
safeguard the manner in which decisions to hasten death
are made, the strength of the state's interest is substan-
tially reduced in such circumstances.287
Why is the state's interest in protecting and preserving
human life "diminished if the person it seeks to protect is
permanently ill or permanently comatose and has expressed a
wish that he be permitted to die without further medical
treatment"?218 Why, if "the state may still seek to prolong the
lives of terminally ill or comatose patients,"28 9 may it not do so
through an absolute ban on assisted suicide? Why, if a state
may regulate assisted suicide, may it not ban the practice
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altogether? After all, any regulation will have the unavoidable
consequence of keeping some unlucky terminally or "perma-
nently" ill or comatose patients alive longer than they would
have wished.
There can be no doubt that the Ninth Circuit's judgment
about the relative strength of the state's interest in preserving
and protecting human life in individual cases is, at bottom, one
of policy. Surely Roe's determination that the state's interest in
preserving or protecting human life waxes during the course of
a pregnancy was also a policy judgment. But if Roe rejected the
business of making such policy judgments once the fetus was
capable of existence outside of the womb,290 what basis is there
for the Ninth Circuit to maintain that an individual's actual
existence is not "existence enough" for a state's interest in her
life to be compelling? The opinion does not say.
As surely as Roe teaches that the state's interest in the
potential life of a fetus grows as the fetus approaches term, it
teaches also that the state's interest in the preservation of a
woman's health grows.29' Indeed, Roe held that after the first
trimester of pregnancy, "a State may regulate the abortion
procedure to the extent that the regulation reasonably relates
to the preservation and protection of maternal health."292
Following the logic of this holding, it stands to reason that if
a state may make the policy judgment to regulate, or even
prohibit altogether, an abortion procedure that would pose a
grave risk to a woman's life or health, it may also make the
policyjudgment to regulate, or prohibit altogether, a procedure
such as assisted suicide, which is both intended and designed
to result in death.293
290. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1973) (holding that the state's interest
in the potential life of a fetus becomes compelling when the fetus reaches viability).
291. Roe, 410 U.S. at 150, 162-63 (recognizing the state's interest in the health
and safety of the pregnant woman and the state's interest in the potential life of the
fetus and explaining when the state's interest in the health of the mother becomes
"compelling"). The Casey joint opinion did not disturb Roe's holding that the state has
"important and legitimate interest[s] in preserving and protecting the health of the
pregnant woman [and] in protecting the potentiality of human life." Planned Parent-
hood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 875-76 (1992) (quoting Roe, 410
U.S. at 162). While rejecting Roe's trimester framework, id. at 876, 878, the Casey
joint opinion expressly affirmed that "[als with any medical procedure, the State may
enact regulations to further the health or safety of a woman seeking an abortion," id.
at 878, but made clear that "[u]nnecessary health regulations that have the purpose
or effect of presenting a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion impose
an undue burden on the right." Id.
292. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
293. See Spindelman, supra note 99.
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Quill v. Vacco
Following quickly on the heels of Compassion in Dying, a
three-judge panel of the Second Circuit ruled 2-1 in Quill v.
Vacco that New York state's prohibition on assisted suicide
violated the Equal Protection Clause. 294 The opinion in the
case rejected a substantive due process rationale for the right
claimed in the case.295
In essence, the Second Circuit's equal protection theory
rests upon two rather controversial findings. First, the court
found that all competent persons who are in the final stages
of illness and wish to hasten their deaths are similarly situ-
ated,296 whether they wish "to hasten their deaths" by refus-
ing lifesaving medical treatment, or by "self-administering"
physician-prescribed medication intended to induce death.297
Second, the Quill court found that the state's law banning
assisted suicide lacked any rational relationship to a legiti-
mate governmental interest that would justify the unequal
treatment of the "similarly situated" terminally ill.
298
"Similar Situations": The Cruzan Wrinkle.
The Second Circuit's finding that all terminally ill individu-
als in the final stages of terminal illness are "similarly
situated" when it comes to "hastening their deaths" flows
from the court's unwillingness to accept that there is any
constitutionally cognizable difference between refusing life-
sustaining medical treatment and committing physician-
assisted suicide. 299 To the Quill court, this looks like a simple
syllogism. Because both (a) the decision to refuse lifesaving
medical treatment and (b) the decision to commit physician-
assisted suicide amount to (c) the "conscious decision" to
hasten one's death, those terminally ill individuals who
294. Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 731 (2d Cir. 1996).
295. Id. at 723-25.
296. Id. at 727, 729.
297. Id. at 729.
298. Id. at 727, 729-31.
299. Id. at 729-30.
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would make (a) the decision to refuse lifesaving medical
treatment must be "similarly situated" to those terminally ill
individuals who would make (b) the decision to commit
physician-assisted suicide.
This is the same syllogism, of course, to which the Compas-
sion in Dying court adverts when arguing that Cruzan recog-
nized a broad right to hasten inevitable death, including
death by assisted suicide.00 For the same reasons that it is
not persuasive there, it is not persuasive in the equal protec-
tion context.0 1
Does the State Have Even a Legitimate Interest
in the Lives of the Terminally Ill?
Assuming arguendo that all those in the final stages of a
terminal illness (whatever that might mean in constitutional
terms) are similarly situated, there still remains the Second
Circuit's finding that New York's law against assisted suicide
has no rational relationship to a legitimate state interest.
30 2
The Second Circuit takes the position that the state's interest
in preserving and protecting the lives of the terminally ill is
not legitimate. The court writes: "But what interest can the
state possibly have in requiring the prolongation of a life that
is all but ended? Surely, the state's interest lessens as the
potential for life diminishes.",30  Terminally ill people are
alive, and are not individuals lacking the "potential for
life."30 4 Compassion in Dying teaches that the state has no
"compelling" interest in the lives of the terminally ill;30 5 Quill
goes even further, holding that the state may even lack a
"legitimate" interest in such lives.
300. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 814-16 (9th Cir.
1996).
301. Note the irony of the Second Circuit's reliance upon Justice Scalia's sepa-
rate concurrence in Cruzan as support for this proposition. It is true that Justice
Scalia thought the "dichotomy between action and inaction" unpersuasive. But
Justice Scalia would have left all such judgments about which forms of suicide to
permit and which forms to prohibit within the legislative bailiwick.
302. Quill, 80 F.3d at 727, 729-31.
303. Id. at 729 (emphasis added).
304. See also supra text accompanying notes 165-72 (discussing Sedler's com-
ment that "the terminally ill have 'no life left to preserve.' ").
305. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996).
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Do State Laws Banning Assisted Suicide
Draw a Valid Line?
The Second Circuit appears to argue in the alternative that,
if the state's interest in the lives of the terminally ill is legiti-
mate, this interest bears no rational relationship to the state's
ban on assisted suicide:
[Wihat business is it of the state to require the continuation
of agony when the result is imminent and inevitable? What
concern prompts the state to interfere with a mentally
competent patient's "right to define [his] own concept of
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery
of human life," when the patient seeks to have drugs pre-
scribed to end life during the final stages of a terminal
illness? The greatly reduced interest of the state in preserv-
ing life compels the answer to these questions: "None."" 6
Ordinarily, the rational relationship test presents no inordinate-
ly high threshold.0 7 Although there have been a few Supreme
Court cases in which the rational relationship test has showed
its teeth,0 8 the numerous reasons commentators have given in
defense of bans against assisted suicide309 would have been
enough -to convince the Second Circuit that New York's law
easily met the rational relationship test, as the Supreme Court
will likely agree.
If Not This Line, What?
Other commentators will no doubt seize upon the most basic
flaw in the Second Circuit's reasoning: the court's equal
306. Quill, 80 F.3d at 730 (citations omitted).
307. See RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOwAK, 3 TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
23 (1992) ("A majority of the justices will uphold governmental classifications under
this standard unless no conceivable set of facts could establish a rational relationship
between the classification and an arguably legitimate end of government."); id. at 27
("Even though the classification may seem unreasonable or unfair, a majority of the
justices will not strike the law so long as it is conceivable that the classification might
promote a legitimate governmental interest.").
308. See, e.g., Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985); Romer
v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
309. See supra note 223.
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protection theory proves too much.31° If a state, according to the
Second Circuit, cannot draw a constitutionally permissible line
between refusal of lifesaving medical treatment and physician-
assisted suicide, it would seem to follow that a state may not
draw a distinction between assisted suicide and active voluntary
euthanasia.
And if a state may not treat the terminally ill who would
choose to refuse lifesaving medical treatment any differently
from the terminally ill who would choose to commit physician-
assisted suicide, what is to be said of those who now have the
right to refuse lifesaving medical treatment? Under Quill, do
they also have a right to physician-assisted suicide? To active
voluntary euthanasia? If the Equal Protection Clause does not
countenance a line between action and inaction in this context,
would that clause countenance a line between state inaction on
the one hand and state action on the other?
311
Some proponents of assisted suicide, no doubt, would dismiss
such assertions as scare tactics. If, however, these individuals
insist that principle demands that the Constitution recognize
that it is the end and not the means that defines what is at
stake in the current court challenges to state laws against
assisted suicide, then principle also demands that the Constitu-
tion erase the lines between state inaction and state action.
Although some might consider this an avenue of constitutional
jurisprudence worth pursuing, "[tihis would be too brave a new
world for me and, I submit, for our Constitution."312
310. See, e.g., Alexander M. Capron, Easing the Passing, HASTINGS CENTER REP.,
July-Aug. 1994, at 26.
311. Professor Louis Michael Seidman, in the course of analyzing Justice Scalia's
concurring opinion in Cruzan, has ventured to answer this last question in the
negative.
Just as there is no difference between an individual who kills herself and an
individual who allows herself to die, so too, it would seem, there is no distinction
between passive state acquiescence in the suicide of one of its citizens and active
state assistance.
Seidman, supra note 137, at 68.
312. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 313 n.3 (1990)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
